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APPROPRIATE STANDARDS FOR A BUYER'S REFUSAL TO
KEEP GOODS TENDERED BY A SELLER
WILLIAm H. LAWRENCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tender of delivery by the seller gives the buyer a choice: the
buyer can either accept the tendered goods or refuse them. Ac-
ceptance makes the buyer liable to pay the purchase price of the
goods,' although an action for damages protects the buyer's
interest if the goods are in any respect nonconforming.2 The
option to refuse the goods can be exercised by rejecting the goods
prior to accepting them3 or by revoking an acceptance already
made.4 An aggrieved buyer who refuses tendered goods is given
a different measure of resulting damages because the buyer does
not take or retain possession of the goods.5
Different legal standards have governed the rights to reject
and to revoke under Article 2, and several aspects of those stan-
dards have become the subject of increased scrutiny during the
revision process. Several of the more controversial issues sur-
rounding the revision concern aspects of the right to reject and
to revoke. This Article is directed toward providing a resolution
of these issues based on an analysis of the underlying policies. I
revisit this subject area, having expressed my views on several
previous occasions, 6 and I necessarily draw heavily from that
* Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.A., J.D., Univer-
sity of Oregon.
1. "The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted." U.C.C. § 2-
607(1) (1990). Acceptance of goods is defined in U.C.C. § 2-606.
2. The measure of damages most commonly utilized provides the buyer with the
difference between "the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
had if they had been as warranted." Id. § 2-714(2).
3. Id. §§ 2-601, 2-602.
4. Id. § 2-608.
5. A buyer who "covers" by procuring comparable goods elsewhere can recover
damages based upon the actual cover price expended. Id. § 2-712. Otherwise, the
buyer's damages are calculated on the contract price/market price differential. Id. §
2-713.
6. William H. Lawrence, Cure in Contracts for the Sale of Goods: Looking Beyond
Section 2-508, 21 UCC L.J. 333 (1989) [hereinafter Lawrence, Beyond Section 2-5081;
William H. Lawrence, Cure Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Prac-
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prior work, as my views, for the most part, remain unchanged. A
different perspective on these issues is provided by Professor
John Sebert, who advocated revisions in this area of Article 2
prior to the appointment of the Article 2 Drafting Committee.7 I
also take this opportunity to respond to several of his positions.
The following four parts of this Article focus on the broad
topics affecting the standards that pertain to a buyer's refusal to
keep goods tendered by a seller. Part II addresses rejection by
the buyer, and continues my argument for retention of the per-
fect tender rule as the standard to govern a buyer's right to
reject. My primary thesis is that adoption of the substantial
impairment standard to govern rejections would force applica-
tion of a standard adopted as a compromise onto a class of con-
tracts for which the compromise is both unnecessary and unde-
sirable. Part III covers the unique rules applied to installment
contracts. I acquiesce in the application of the substantial im-
pairment standard to the decision of a buyer to cancel the con-
tract because of nonconformities in one or more of the install-
ments, but contend that the perfect tender rule should govern
the right to reject a single installment.
Part IV addresses the buyer's right to revoke an acceptance,
and focuses on several issues, including the subjective nature of
the substantial impairment standard, the increased limitations
on the right to revoke, the effect of a wrongful revocation, use of
the goods after revocation, and payment by the buyer for use of
the goods prior to revocation. Part V deals with the seller's right
to cure a nonconforming tender. This final section covers several
controversial issues, including whether the reasonable grounds
requirement should be retained, whether repair should consti-
tute an adequate cure, whether a money allowance to the buyer
tices and Prescriptions, 21 UCC L.J. 138 (1988) [hereinafter Lawrence, Cure Under
Article 2]; William H. Lawrence, The Prematurely Reported Demise of the Perfect
Tender Rule, 35 KAN. L. REV. 557 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, Perfect Tender Rule];
William H. Lawrence, Cure After Breach of Contract Under the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts: An Analytical Comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code, 70
MINN. L. REV. 713 (1986) [hereinafter Lawrence, Cure Under the Restatement
(Second)].
7. John A. Sebert, Jr., Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Some Modest Proposals, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 375 (1990).
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is an effective cure, and whether a seller should be allowed to
cure following revocation of acceptance by the buyer. I also rec-
ommend a structural change in Article 2 to facilitate proper
application of the cure concept. The discussion throughout this
Article is devoted to assisting deliberation in the ongoing revi-
sion process.
II. REJECTION
A. Study Group Recommendation
A majority of the Study Group recommended that the perfect
tender rule be retained as the standard for an aggrieved buyer
to reject tendered goods.8 The recommendation is interesting,
given the extensive attacks that a number of commentators have
waged against the perfect tender rule.9 The issue has hardly
been resolved through the deliberations of the Study Group.
Some members of the Study Group supported an alternative
proposal that would replace the perfect tender rule with a re-
quirement that would permit rejection only if a nonconformity
"substantially impairs the value of the performance to the buy-
er."'0 The issue predictably will draw considerable attention
8. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB
STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2, PRELIMINARY REPORT 158
(Rec. A2.6(1)(A)) (1990) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT].
9. See, e.g., JOHN E. MURRAY, COMMERCIAL LAW: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 119
(1975); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 355-57
(3d ed. 1988); John Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 479-
80 (1949); K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society: I, 37 COLUM. L.
REV. 341, 378, 398 & n.146 (1937) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On Warranty]; K.N.
Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558, 566-67 (1940)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Federal Sales Act]; Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 215-16 (1963); Sebert, supra note 7, at
422-25; Leonard M. Parldns, Comment, Substantial Performance: The Real Alterna-
tive to Perfect Tender Under the U.C.C., 12 HOUS. L. REv. 437, 452-54 (1975).
10. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 159-60 (Rec. A2.6(1)(B)). This substitute
standard is the same requirement applied to cases of revocation under Article 2. See
U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1990); infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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from the drafters of the revision." The superior approach to
this issue is to retain the perfect tender rule.
B. Inapplicable Rationale
Scrapping the perfect tender rule for the substantial impair-
ment standard would force a standard that was adopted as a
necessary accommodation upon a situation where such a com-
promise is not necessary. Substantial impairment is comparable
to the common law concept of material breach, 2 with its accom-
panying antithetical concept of substantial performance."
These common law doctrines were introduced in order to amelio-
rate the harsh effect resulting from the recognition of con-
structive conditions of exchange. Lord Mansfield recognized the
dependency of covenants in a contract by implying a condition
on the order for performance of the covenants in the absence of
an express provision in the parties' agreement.'4 By creating an
implied-in-law condition on the order of the contracting parties'
performances, 5 Lord Mansfield greatly enhanced the risk of
forfeiture because the party required to proceed could lose all
11. The A.B.A. Task Force did not take a specific position on this issue. It, how-
ever, did urge the Drafting Committee to "reconsider whether to adopt a substantial
performance test, as some members of the Study Group recommend." Task Force of
the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Docu-
ments of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, An Appraisal of the
March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study
Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 1160 (1991) [hereinafter Task Force]. "The Drafting
Committee should carefully consider the benefits and costs of such a rule." Id.
12. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 358.
13. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 461-64 (3d ed. 1987).
14. See Jones v. Barkley, 99 Eng. Rep. 434, 437-38 (KB. 1781) (paraphrasing the
opinion of Kingston v. Preston).
15. Corbin described constructive conditions as follows:
A certain fact... may operate as a condition because the court believes
that the parties would have intended it to operate as such if they had
thought about it at all, or because the court believes that by reason of
the mores of the time justice requires that it should so operate. It may
then be described as a condition implied by law, or better as a construc-
tive condition.
Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 743-44
(1919). See generally Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42
COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1942) (discussing the underlying policy considerations that
shape the law of constructive conditions).
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rights on the contract by tendering anything less than complete
performance. The forfeiture risk is particularly poignant in situ-
ations like construction contracts in which labor and materials
expended in a performance that falls short of complete perfor-
mance cannot be returned to the contractor."6
Shortly after introducing the concept of constructive condi-
tions, Lord Mansfield created a doctrinal escape valve to avoid
the oppressive results that could follow from the requirement of
strict compliance with such conditions. The potentially harsh
impact was mitigated by recognizing a less demanding standard
for satisfying constructive conditions. This approach has since
evolved and has become embodied in the correlative doctrines of
substantial performance and material breach.' Substantial
performance, rather than exact performance, is sufficient to sat-
isfy the constructive condition; the less-than-perfect tender con-
stitutes a nonmaterial breach but the constructive condition is
16. As one court noted:
There will be harshness sometimes and oppression in the implication of a
condition when the thing upon which labor has been expended is incapa-
ble of surrender because united to the land, and equity and reason in
the implication of a like condition when the subject-matter, if defective, is
in shape to be returned.
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890-91 (N.Y. 1921). Farnsworth and
Young elaborated on the unique problems that arise in construction contracts:
[T]he rule [of substantial performance] has found its chief proving ground
in suits on construction contracts.
Why should this be so? Several considerations suggest the answer.
As for employment contracts, it is usual for an employer to pay wages at
short intervals, and to reserve the power of termination at will. Leases of
real property have traditionally been regarded as exempt from the usual
contract rules of constructive conditions. As for contracts for the sale of
goods, the party who is denied a remedy does not suffer an investment
loss, ordinarily, in the same degree as a builder whose earnings prove
uncollectible. As for land sale contracts, enforcement is regularly sought
in a court of equity, in which there are specialized rules serving some of
the same objects as the doctrine of substantial performance.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS
695 (4th ed. 1988).
17. See Boone v. Eyre, 126 Eng. Rep. 160(a) (KB. 1777).
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satisfied, 8 preventing cancellation of the contract by the ag-
grieved party.19
The rationale for adoption of the substantial performance
doctrine does not extend to contracts for the sale of goods. Most
forfeitures can be avoided in these cases by the breaching seller
recovering the tendered goods.2" Thus, the perfect tender rule
does not have to be abandoned in order to achieve just results
for the sale of goods.
C. Advantages of the Perfect Tender Rule
1. Enhanced Certainty
Not only would use of the substantial impairment standard to
govern rejection in sales cases apply the doctrine to a class of
cases in which it is not needed, it would undercut the benefits
associated with the perfect tender rule. The perfect tender rule
provides the buyer greater certainty after a nonconforming ten-
der than is possible under the substantial performance stan-
dard.2 A buyer need only ascertain a good faith basis of dissat-
18. As one court noted:
The courts never say that one who makes a contract fills the measure of
his duty by less than full performance. They do say, however, that an
omission, both trivial and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for by al-
lowance of the resulting damage, and will not always be the breach of a
condition to be followed by a forfeiture.
Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 890.
19. See generally Lawrence, Cure Under the Restatement (Second), supra note 6, at
714-17.
20. The elimination of all forfeiture is impossible, even in a sales case. The seller
may incur costs of freight and insurance for reshipment and administrative costs of
resale. Additional costs also are imposed when the buyer retains the defective goods:
the cost of adapting the goods to the buyer's use or of disposing of them and cover-
ing elsewhere, and the cost of calculating damages. Two scholars who have focused
extensively on these costs and their policy-choice implications disagree on which of
these cost categories is likely to predominate. Professor Priest assumes that costs
associated with reshipment and resale usually will be higher. George L. Priest,
Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960, 965 n.10 (1978). Profes-
sor Schwartz implicitly assumes that adaptation costs will predominate. See Alan
Schwartz, Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains, 16 B.C.
INDus. & COM. L. REv. 543, 547-51 (1975).
21. "Plainly, a test as flexible as substantial performance sacrifices predictability
to achieve justice." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 617 (2d ed. 1990).
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isfaction with a nonconforming tender in order to reject the
goods rightfully." An aggrieved party under the substantial
impairment standard, in addition to the good faith determina-
tion, must weigh several potentially conflicting considerations
that a court might subsequently apply in order to determine
whether a suspension or rejection of performance was appropri-
ate.' The perfect tender rule provides more certainty.'
The consequences associated with the response of an ag-
grieved buyer make this enhanced certainty desirable. In proba-
bly the most-quoted line in material breach jurisprudence, the
court in Walker & Co. v. Harrison' stated the potential risk
assigned to the aggrieved party:
[Tihe injured party's determination that there has been a
material breach, justifying his own repudiation, is fraught
with peril, for should such determination, as viewed by a
later court in the calm of its contemplation, be unwarranted,
the repudiator himself will have been guilty of material
breach and himself have become the aggressor, not an inno-
cent victim.
26
In any case in which materiality of the breach is not certain,
the aggrieved party faces a Hobson's choice: proceeding as
though the breach is material exposes the aggrieved party,
22. The good faith element is discussed infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
23. In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is
material, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit
which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated
for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including
any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to
offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979).
24. The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts describe the material
breach standard as "necessarily imprecise and flexible." Id. § 241 cmt. a.
25. 81 N.W.2d 352 (Mich. 1957).
26. Id. at 355.
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whereas not responding can result in a waiver of that party's
rights. The perfect tender rule avoids this problem by giving the
injured party more predictable criteria by which to assess the
appropriate legal response.
a. Workability of the Substantial Impairment Standard
Professor Sebert supports his position to substitute a substan-
tial impairment standard for the perfect tender rule by bestow-
ing the standard with kudos of workability.28 He stresses that
its use in other contexts has proven to work reasonably well and
that "a reasonable consensus is developing concerning how to
interpret and apply the substantial impairment standard of
section 2-608. "29
The argument simply validates the wisdom of Lord Mansfield
in his choice of a mechanism to alleviate the harshness of forfei-
tures associated with the introduction of constructive conditions.
If material breach analysis had proven to be unworkable, the
law of contracts surely would have evolved differently. The argu-
ment fails, however, to validate use of the same criteria to re-
place a more certain legal standard in a context in which its use
is not necessary. Surely no one would suggest that the deter-
mination of substantial impairment, with its myriad of poten-
tially conflicting criteria, is as certain a legal standard as the
perfect tender rule. Anyone who tends toward such a belief
should observe first-year law students when the concept of mate-
rial breach is introduced in their contracts class! Additionally,
how many lawyers would prefer to advise an aggrieved buyer or
litigate that client's case under a material breach standard rath-
er than the perfect tender rule? Experience has proven that the
material breach standard does work reasonably well. It was
adopted, however, as a necessary accommodation that resulted
in lessening the degree of certainty affecting an aggrieved
27. The choice of the appropriate standard to govern a buyer's rejection was de-
bated extensively prior to the initial promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code.
One of the reasons that the drafters rejected the substantial impairment standard
was their belief that "the buyer should not be required to guess at his peril whether
a breach is material." Task Force, supra note 11, at 1159-60.
28. Sebert, supra note 7, at 399, 407.
29. Id. at 399.
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party's decision on cancellation of the contract. Further embrac-
ing the more vague standard under circumstances where it is
not necessary is simply not a good policy choice."0
In arguing for the adoption of the substantial impairment
standard to determine a buyer's right to reject, Professor Sebert
contends that certainty and predictability of results will be im-
proved by the change."' His contention, however, is not based
on the characteristics inherent in the two standards. Rather he
asserts that the confusion that has resulted from manipulative
actions of the courts and from statutory limitations on the per-
fect tender rule can be reduced by simply replacing the perfect
tender rule with the standard of substantial performance.
This area of Article 2 unquestionably has been accompanied
by considerable confusion. I disagree with Professor Sebert on
the source of the confusion, however. Many commentators have
questioned whether any life remains in the perfect tender rule
as it is codified in Article 2.32 Professor Ellen Peters led the
doubters in 1963 when she concluded that the perfect tender
rule, as embodied in Article 2, is "a mere shadow of its formerly
30. Since the element of unjust enrichment present in construction contracts
is absent, it makes some sense to put the responsibility for preparing a
perfect tender upon the seller rather than getting involved in a compli-
cated evaluation of objective and subjective factors which underlie the
substantial performance doctrine. At the very least if the seller has in
fact made a defective tender and the buyer's dissatisfaction is honest and
genuine, there seems to be less reason for imposing the doctrine of sub-
stantial performance upon the attempt to reject.
RICHARD E. SPEMEL ET AL., TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
LAW 955 (3d ed. 1981).
31. Sebert, supra note 7, at 418-19, 423.
32. See, e.g., VERN COUNTRYMAN ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
957 (2d ed. 1982); MURRAY, supra note 9, at 119; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9,
at 355-57; Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material
Breach-Common Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 553, 589 n.191 (1976); Peters, supra note 9, at 206;
Sebert, supra note 7, at 384-85, 422; George I. Wallach, The Buyer's Right to Return
Unsatisfactory Goods-The Uniform Commercial Code Remedies of Rejection and
Revocation of Acceptance, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 20, 23 (1980); Douglas J. Whaley, Ten-
der, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The "UCC's "TARR"-Baby, 24 DRAKE L.
REV. 52, 54-55 (1974); Note, UCC Section 2-508. Seller's Right to Cure Nonconform-
ing Goods, 6 RUT.-CAAM. L.J. 387, 388 (1974); William B. Murphy, Note, Uniform
Commercial Code-Rejection and Revocation-Seller's Right to Cure a Nonconforming
Tender, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 938, 941 (1969).
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robust self."33 These commentators have advocated use of the
substantial impairment standard as a superior approach, and in
one instance even contended that "the Code well nigh abolishes
the [perfect tender] rule."34 The influence of this commentary
on the courts is hardly surprising,35 but to advance the tenden-
cy of some courts to inject substantial impairment requirements
into rejection cases as a reason to adopt that standard is simply
argument by bootstrapping. The seeds of confusion were planted
by scholars who prematurely reported the demise of the perfect
tender rule. 6 The drafters of the revision to Article 2 should
not only retain the perfect tender rule; they should strongly reaf-
firm this position in the comments in order to overcome the
legacy of doubts that have been sown as to its efficacy.
The confusion attributed to limitations that are codified in
Article 2 on the exercise of the right of rejection under the per-
fect tender rule is also insufficient to support abandonment of
the rule. The primary limitations on rejection are the obligation
of good faith and the potential right of the seller to cure38 the
rejected tender.3 9 The inclusion of any limitation on the exer-
33. Peters, supra note 9, at 206.
34. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 304 (2d
ed. 1980). "The Code rejects the perfect tender rule in sales law, once an open ref-
uge for the technically minded." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 15-16.
35. For blatant judicial statements of deviation from the perfect tender rule, see,
for example, D.P. Technology Corp. v. Sherwood Tool, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1038 (D.
Conn. 1990) (holding that the Connecticut Supreme Court would require that a delay
in delivery of specially manufactured goods must be substantial in order for the
buyer to reject under § 2-601, and remanding for determination of whether a 16-day
delay was substantial); McKenzie v. Alla-Ohio Coals, Inc., 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 852 (D.D.C. 1979) (finding that a buyer who has suffered no damage
cannot reject because of insubstantial nonconformity); Clark v. Zaid, Inc., 282 A.2d
483 (Md. 1971) (holding that in determining the right of a buyer to reject furniture
the court must consider factors such as the nature and extent of damage and wheth-
er it could be repaired).
36. In a previous article, I have shown both that these commentators have greatly
exaggerated the extent to which the limitations included in Article 2 undercut appli-
cation of the perfect tender rule and that the limitations on the standard that are
codified in Article 2, for the most part, reflect restrictions that the law previously
recognized as well. Lawrence, Perfect Tender Rule, supra note 6, at 559-73.
37. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
38. The primary cure provision in Article 2 is § 2-508.
39. The courts admittedly often have not done an admirable job of applying the
good faith concept in the context of rejection or in applying the cure concept in
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cise of a legal concept inevitably adds complexity, with a con-
comitant adverse effect on certainty. The perfect tender rule,
however, is not, and should not be, absolute. As subsequent
discussion in this Article demonstrates,40 strong policy reasons
support condoning only rejections exercised in good faith and
allowing appropriate cure rights for the seller.
Any lessened certainty associated with these limitations on
the right to reject will not be alleviated by substituting the sub-
stantial impairment standard for the perfect tender rule. The
most obvious reason for this conclusion is that the same limita-
tions will apply even if the substantial impairment standard
were adopted. Good faith is a pervasive obligation affecting all
aspects of a contracting party's performance and enforcement
under the contract.41 Enforcement of a right to reject can be
exercised only in good faith, irrespective of the standard adopted
to trigger that right. Cure rights also will continue even if mate-
rial breach is needed to reject.42
The continued relevance of the adopted standard once a
breaching seller invokes the right to cure is another reason the
uncertainty associated with the limitations on a buyer's right to
reject will not disappear by changing the standard upon which
the right to reject is based. The seller's right is invoked by noti-
fying the buyer of the intent to cure,41 which has the legal ef-
fect of suspending the buyer's rejection." Unfortunately, not all
general. See the criticisms advanced in Lawrence, Perfect Tender Rule, supra note 6,
at 570-73 (noting the failure of courts and commentators to recognize the role of
good faith in rejections); Lawrence, Cure Under Article 2, supra note 6, at 142-69
(noting problems in most cases of applying the concept of cure); Lawrence, Beyond
Section 2-508, supra note 6, at 337-40, 344-59 (same). Again, however, scholars gen-
erally have not supported the courts with helpful commentary.
40. See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
41. "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
42. "[Tihe scope and content of § 2-508 obviously depend upon any revisions made
in the 'perfect tender' rule." PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 144 (Rec.
A2.5(5)(C)).
43. U.C.C. § 2-508(1) and (2) condition the seller's right to cure on seasonable
notification to the buyer of the intention to cure.
44. "We agreed that under either subsection [of § 2-5081, the buyer's remedies are
suspended after receipt of the seller's timely notice until the seller fails to make a
timely and proper cure." PRELMIINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 143 (Rec. A2.5(5)(C)).
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purported cures will prove to be satisfactory, which raises the
question of whether the aggrieved buyer can reject the cure ten-
der. The right to make this subsequent rejection will depend
upon whether the cure has provided goods that satisfy the stan-
dard adopted to govern the rejection right.45 Cure no longer
operates as a limitation at this point. The aggrieved buyer either
accepts or rejects the cure tender. That determination again is
clearly more certain under the perfect tender rule than it is
under the substantial impairment standard.
b. Troubling Study Group Commentary
A statement in the Study Group commentary that causes
concern is the contention that "a statutory requirement of sub-
stantial impairment emerges indirectly from the limitations
imposed upon § 2-601."4" This statement is highly inaccurate
and can serve only to perpetuate the confusion generated in the
past by the failure to maintain proper conceptualizations. The
limitation that a buyer's rejection must be exercised in good
faith does not have this effect. The right to reject arises when
the goods tendered by the seller fail in any respect to conform to
the contract terms. The good faith requirement prevents abuses
45. In a previous article, I described the situation as follows:
Following a notification of intent to cure, one of three things will happen:
the seller will not go forward with a cure within the respective time
allowed; the seller will provide a conforming tender; or the seller will
provide another nonconforming tender. In the first instance, the buyer's
original rejection will become effective again upon the seller's failure to
make a timely cure. The seller would have announced the intent to cure
but not have followed through by exercising the right, and further action
will not be necessary for an effective rejection. In the second case, a new
conforming tender will cure the original nonconformity and will terminate
the right of the buyer to reject. Continuing to reject would be wrongful
and would constitute a breach by the buyer. In the third situation, the
seller's second tender, like the first, is nonconforming, but the buyer's
initial rejection covers only the first tender. The buyer will be required to
respond to the subsequent tender of ineffectual cure, and failure to do so
after a reasonable time to inspect the newly tendered goods will result in
their acceptance by the buyer. Since the purported cure does not conform
in all respects to the contract, however, section 2-601 gives the aggrieved
buyer the right to reject the new tender.
Lawrence, Perfect Tender Rule, supra note 6, at 567-68 (citations omitted).
46. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 159.
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in the exercise of this right by limiting its availability to circum-
stances in which the buyer is honestly dissatisfied with the
tender and in which rejection is consistent with reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair trade. The same good faith require-
ment would apply if substantial impairment governed the right
to reject, but the buyer's right would also be conditioned upon a
material breach by the seller.
Applicable trade standards could inject elements of materiali-
ty into the good faith requirement. That possibility under the
facts of some cases, however, does not support the sweeping
assertion that the good faith limitation moves the perfect tender
rule toward the substantial impairment standard. Trade usage
or course of dealing between the parties might also limit a par-
ticular buyer to rejection only for substantial impairment,47
and, of course, the parties can include such a requirement in
their contract terms expressly. These occasions in which the
buyer is precluded from insisting upon perfect tender simply
represent instances when the parties, through different sources
of contract terms (express terms, trade usage, or the implied
term of good faith) have contracted out of the perfect tender
rule.
The seller's right to cure a nonconforming tender is another
significant limitation on the buyer's right to reject, but it does
not move the perfect tender rule toward substantial impairment.
A seller who invokes the right to cure suspends the effectiveness
of the buyer's rejection, and if the seller tenders a cure, the
buyer will either accept or reject the cure. Under the perfect
tender rule, a buyer acting in good faith could reject a cure ten-
der that does not conform to the contract. Under a substantial
impairment standard, the buyer would lack the right to reject a
cure tender that does not conform so long as the nonconformity
no longer substantially impairs the buyer's interests. Under
either approach a consistent legal standard governs the buyer's
right to reject both the initial tender and any cure tender. Sec-
47. Lancaster Glass Corp. v. Phillips ECG, Inc., 835 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that repeated acceptance of delivery of goods that deviate slightly from an
original engineering drawing provided by the buyer constitutes a course of perfor-
mance that precludes the buyer's right to reject subsequent deliveries).
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tion 2-601 states a perfect tender rule, and the right to cure does
not move it toward substantial impairment.48
The commentary of the Study Group suffers from another
common deficiency. It refers to a provision like section 2-608 as
a limitation on section 2-601.41 Section 2-608 covers revocation
of acceptance by a buyer, which is possible only following an
acceptance." Section 2-601 covers rejection by a buyer, which
becomes impossible once the buyer accepts.5 Revocation is not
a limitation on section 2-601; that section has no applicability in
the context of a revocation. The codification of the perfect tender
rule in section 2-601 does not state a pervasive standard for
Article 2; it simply states the standard for a buyer who wants to
reject.
Although the perfect tender rule has advantages over the
substantial impairment standard and can be used fairly in con-
tracts for sales of goods, the drafters did not adopt it as a singu-
lar standard throughout Article 2. The perfect tender rule is
stated only in section 2-601, the section that governs a buyer's
general right to reject tendered goods.52 In four other sections
the drafters adopted the standard of substantial impairment:
section 2-608 on revocation of acceptance;53 section 2-610 on
anticipatory repudiation; 4 section 2-612 on rejection in install-
ment contracts; 5 and section 2-504 on certain grounds for rejec-
tion in shipment contracts. 5 Only the last two of the Article 2
provisions that incorporate the substantial impairment standard
qualify as true limitations on section 2-601 because they are the
only ones that apply to rejections.57 The rationales that under-
lie the selection of the substantial impairment standard in each
48. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1990) (Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery).
49. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 159.
50. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1990).
51. "Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accept-
ed . . . ." Id. § 2-607(2).
52. Id. § 2-601.
53. Id. § 2-608.
54. Id. § 2-610.
55. Id. § 2-612.
56. Id. § 2-504.
57. Id.; id. § 2-612.
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of these contexts are provided in subsequent discussion.58 For
the present, the critical observation is that the initial drafters
did not elect a single model of seller performance in choosing
between perfect tender and substantial impairment. Rather,
they adopted each of the standards in different contexts.
2. Economic Efficiency
Other advantages of the perfect tender rule, in addition to
enhanced certainty of application, have been enumerated by
scholars. An application of economic efficiency analysis has led
two authors to suggest that the perfect tender rule more effec-
tively reduces the costs of nonconforming tender than the sub-
stantial performance standard.
A perfect tender standard indicates clearly the consequences
of any non-conformity, facilitating negotiations to minimize
the effects of a seller's failure to comply. Since sellers know
that even a slight variation may constitute breach, they are
encouraged to allocate explicitly the risk of variations from
the contract description. Once a breach has occurred, the
certainty of the result of any litigation encourages the parties
to settle their dispute through private bargaining and reduc-
es the opportunities for strategic behavior. 9
3. Promote Quality Standards
The perfect tender rule promotes higher standards of quality
in the marketplace. 0 The case of Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing
Corp.61 was used by one commentator to demonstrate this
58. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
59. ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES
AND POLiCEs 244 (2d ed. 1991).
60. Francis A. Miniter, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Quarter Century Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, and Recent International Developments, 13 GA. L. REV.
805, 826 (1979). Professor Sebert doubts that the perfect tender rule has this effect
and points out that the contention is not supported by empirical evidence. Sebert,
supra note 7, at 423. Unfortunately, empirical evidence is lacking as support for a
substantial portion of legal analysis, including the converse side for this proposition.
However, the high standards associated with a legal base that requires perfect ten-
der certainly cannot be disputed.
61. 269 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. 1971).
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point.62 The seller in Axion Corp. promised to provide valve-
testing equipment with an operating capacity that would be
within a five percent deviation from the specifications indicated
in the contract.1
3
A seller might find that it is significantly cheaper to make
the machinery capable of operation within a seven percent
deviation than to make it operate within only a five percent
deviation as required by the contract. He would be gambling
that the buyer could not make out a case for substantial
impairment independent of the contract and that any dam-
ages that the buyer might prove would be less than his cost
savings in producing the inferior machine.'
In contrast, the perfect tender rule avoids this problem by creat-
ing a positive incentive for sellers to produce goods that meet
contract specifications.65
D. Invalid Complaint
The primary complaint that has been lodged against the per-
fect tender rule is that it enables a buyer to seize upon an incon-
sequential defect in the seller's tender in order to avoid a bad
bargain." This result would be possible if the right to reject
was absolute, but it is not. Section 1-203 provides that "[e]very
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement."67 Rejection is not an
automatically executing right but rather must be enforced
through action by the buyer.68 Consequently, the right to reject
is limited by the obligation to act in good faith.
62. Miniter, supra note 60, at 825-26.
63. Axion Corp., 269 N.E.2d at 666.
64. Miniter, supra note 60, at 826.
65. Another reason why the drafters of the Code rejected the substantial perfor-
mance standard for rejection by buyers of goods is that "proof of materiality would
sometimes require disclosure of the buyer's private affairs such as secret formulas or
processes." Task Force, supra note 11, at 1160.
66. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 157-58.
67. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
68. "Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or




The requirement of good faith is an effective mechanism
against a buyer abusing the right to reject and cancel a contract.
The legitimate expectations of the contracting parties should be
fulfilled by performance." A buyer who receives the full mea-
sure of performance, in the sense of meeting these expectations,
does not have the right to reject, despite some insignificant devi-
ation from the precise contract specifications. The perfect tender
rule does not give buyers the power to seize upon the slightest
contract deviation, even though it is not important to the buyer,
as a pretext for discontinuing the contract. A buyer acts in bad
faith by feigning dissatisfaction with the seller's performance
when the real motive for rejecting the goods is some other con-
sideration,7" such as avoiding the contract obligation during a
falling market.7' The good faith requirement of the Code effec-
tively prevents such improper strategic behavior, and thus as-
sures that application of the perfect tender rule will occur only
in those instances when it is invoked honestly.7"
A desirable revision proposed by the majority in the Study
Group is to add the phrase "if acting in good faith" as an express
limitation to the codification of the perfect tender rule.73 The
benefit that this revision affords is to ensure the applicability of
an additional objective standard of good faith in the case of a
buyer who is a merchant. Express incorporation of the good faith
term in section 2-601 will invoke the Article 2 definition of good
faith, which provides that" 'good faith' in the case of a merchant
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commer-
69. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 536 (1982).
70. At a minimum "good faith" means "honesty in fact in the conduct or transac-
tion concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990).
71. For a study on buyer attempts to reject during the circumstances of a falling
market, see generally Lawrence R. Eno, Price Movement and Unstated Objections to
the Defective Performance of Sales Contracts, 44 YALE L.J. 782 (1935).
72. Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1979) (holding a claim
of dissatisfaction with subsequent deliveries of chipping potatoes after the market
price declined substantially below the contract price in bad faith, making the refusal
to accept a breach); see also Printing Ctr. of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing
Co., 669 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding evidence that buyer rejected to
escape the bargain would support a finding of rejection in bad faith, but noting that
the seller did not present any such evidence).
73. PRELUMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 158 (Rec. A2.6(1)(A)).
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cial standards of fair dealing in the trade."74 This application is
desirable given the doubts expressed by some commentators as
to the applicability of the purely subjective standard to control
attempts by a buyer to evade the contract in the circumstances
of a falling market.75
III. INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS
A. Cancelling the Contract
Section 2-612 governs nonconforming deliveries made under
installment contracts.76 This section does not incorporate the
perfect tender rule. Subsection (3) allows the buyer to cancel the
contract only when the nonconformity of one or more install-
ments "substantially impairs the value of the whole contract."77
The drafters appropriately based the provisions of section 2-
612(3) on the Code principles applicable to anticipatory
repudiation7' because cancellation of the entire contract, rather
74. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1990).
75. See Honnold, supra note 9, at 475-76 (contending that "a legal test framed in
terms of the buyer's state of mind is ... elusive"); Sebert, supra note 7, at 387
(arguing the subjective standard is not as effective a check on a nonmerchant buy-
er).
76. "An 'installment contract' is one which requires or authorizes the delivery of
goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains a
clause 'each delivery is a separate contract' or its equivalent." U.C.C. § 2-612(1)
(1990).
77. Section 2-612(3) provides in its entirety as follows:
Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or more install-
ments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a
breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he
accepts a non-conforming installment without seasonably notifying of
cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to past install-
ments or demands performance as to future installments.
Id. § 2-612(3).
The other true statutory limitation on a buyer's § 2-601 right to reject is U.C.C.
§ 2-504 on shipment contracts. It provides that the failure of a seller to notify the
buyer of the shipment or to make a proper contract for transportation of the goods
"is a ground for rejection only if material delay or loss ensues." Id. § 2-504. This
exception to the perfect tender rule is a reaction to earlier case law in which buyers
rejected because of some noncompliance with shipping arrangements, even though
they did not suffer any perceivable injury. See Lawrence, Perfect Tender Rule, supra
note 6, at 588-90.
78. U.C.C. § 2-610 (1990).
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than just rejection of a tendered installment, affects performance
not yet due. Cancellation in cases of both anticipatory repudia-
tion and defective installments that breach the whole contract is
not premised on the concept of rejection of goods not yet deliv-
ered. Rejection applies only to goods that have been tendered.
Cancellation in cases of executory seller performance is based on
the seller's breach of the contractual obligation not to impair the
buyer's expectations of the promised performance. 9 The right
to cancel the contract, and thereafter sue for total breach 0 aris-
es from an anticipatory repudiation when loss of the perfor-
mance will "substantially impair the value of the contract to the
other."8 ' Section 2-612(3) applies the same standard to the
right to cancel the entire contract following default or noncon-
forming tender of one or more installments of a contract.
The perfect tender rule does not require a seller's perfect
compliance with the obligation not to impair the buyer's expecta-
tion that the promised performance will be forthcoming. Rather,
Article 2 distinguishes between impairment of the security of
expectations of performance by the other party and impairment
of the value of the whole contract. Substantial impairment of the
value of the whole contract is necessary before cancellation of
executory portions of the contract is allowed. 2 In contrast, im-
pairment of security as to future performance gives the ag-
grieved party the right to demand adequate assurances of proper
future performance, not the immediate right to cancel the con-
tract in its entirety."
79. "A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's ex-
pectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired." Id. § 2-609(1).
80. Id. § 2-711.
81. Id. § 2-610.
82. "Whether the non-conformity in any given installment justifies cancellation as
to the future depends, not on whether such non-conformity indicates an intent or
likelihood that the future deliveries will also be defective, but whether the non-con-
formity substantially impairs the value of the whole contract." Id. § 2-612 cmt. 6.
"The most useful test of substantial value is to determine whether material inconve-
nience or injustice will result if the aggrieved party is forced to wait and receive an
ultimate tender minus the part or aspect repudiated." Id. § 2-610 cmt. 3.
83. "When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance
of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due perfor-
mance. . . ." Id. § 2-609(1). The failure to provide adequate assurances can itself
lead to a repudiation: "[Tihis section provides the means by which the aggrieved
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This approach makes sense because adequate assurances
address the buyer's concerns about the seller's performance on
future deliveries. The rationale does not support adoption of the
substantial performance standard when a seller's tender of deliv-
ery in a noninstallment contract fails to meet the contract re-
quirements. The buyer may then invoke the right to reject. In
this situation the aggrieved buyer is not concerned with executo-
ry provisions of the contract. The rationales supporting the per-
fect tender rule then predominate."
B. Rejecting Individual Installments
The second subsection of section 2-612 governs the right of a
buyer to reject an individual nonconforming installment. It al-
lows the buyer to reject any installment whose nonconformity
"substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot
be cured."5
The substantial impairment standard incorporated in section
2-612(2) is not justified. This subsection deals with installments
actually tendered, and, therefore, is not analogous to the antici-
patory breach provisions. The buyer has not accepted the ten-
dered installment yet; consequently, the rationale underlying
section 2-608 on revocation of acceptance also does not apply.
Karl Llewellyn suggested that "standing relations" warrant
separate handling from "single-occasion deals,"" but the section
party may treat the contract as broken if his reasonable grounds for insecurity are
not cleared up within a reasonable time." Id. § 2-609 cmt. 2.
84. See supra notes 21-65 and accompanying text.
85. U.C.C. § 2-612(2) (1990). Section 2-612(2) provides in its entirety as follows:
The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming if the
non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and
cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required docu-
ments; but if the non-conformity does not fall within subsection (3) and
the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must accept
that installment.
Id.
86. Llewellyn, On Warranty, supra note 9, at 375-78; see Whaley, supra note 32,
at 53. Whaley argues:
The policy in installment contracts is to avoid the abrupt termination of
a long term contractual relationship merely for technical reasons and to
keep the contract going. Where many deliveries are contemplated, minor
defects are likely to appear in some installments and it would give the
1654
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2-612(2) provisions on cure appear satisfactory to accommodate
the interests of the continuing relationship created by an install-
ment contract. 7
The section 2-612(2) exception to the perfect tender rule is
inappropriate. The rationale that supports the codification of the
perfect tender rule for rejection in noninstallment cases is equal-
ly applicable to the rejection of the tender of a nonconforming
installment.88 The perfect tender rule would enable aggrieved
buyers to ascertain their interests with respect to nonconforming
installments with greater certainty. When a nonconforming
installment is rightfully rejected, the seller can avoid forfeiture
by reacquiring the rejected installment. A majority of the Study
Group wisely has recommended that the " 'perfect tender' rule
should be available to the buyer or seller when an installment
fails to conform 'in any respect to the contract.' ""
buyer an unreasonable commercial advantage if he could escape from the
contract for the trivial deficiencies which inevitably occur. In an install-
ment contract the buyer has sufficient bargaining position vis-h-vis future
shipments to adjust minor defects. But in a single delivery situation no
future relationship needs protection, and thus it does not seem unfair to
require "exact performance by the seller of his obligations as a condition
to his right to require acceptance."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-106 cmt. 2). This policy articulation ex-
plains why the substantial impairment standard is included in § 2-612(3) as a condi-
tion to the right to terminate an entire installment contract, but it leaves open the
question of why the standard is needed as the basis for the rejection of a single
nonconforming tender under § 2-612(2).
87. Section 2-612(2) precludes the buyer from rejecting a nonconforming tender if
the seller gives adequate assurances of its cure. U.C.C. § 2-612(2) (1990). The cure
provisions are sufficient to keep the contract going. If the seller subsequently is un-
able to cure the nonconformity, that fact might lead to substantial impairment of
the value of the whole contract under § 2-612(3). See Graulich Caterer Inc. v. Hans
Holterbosch, Inc., 243 A.2d 253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (holding that the
inability to cure nonconforming cooked food to be served by the buyer at a pavilion
at the New York World's Fair resulted in a substantial impairment).
88. "[Tlhe reasons for this distinction, which makes the right of rejection turn on
whether a contract of sale is to be performed singly or in installments, are less than
self-evident." Honold, supra note 9, at 476. "Differing results should not flow solely
from the manner in which delivery is taken; if 10,000 widgets are delivered all at
once, a perfect tender rule now applies, whereas if they are delivered 5,000 today
and 5,000 in seven days, a substantial breach test applies." Miniter, supra note 60,
at 809.
89. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 178 (Rec. A2.6(8)(A)). "There is no per-
suasive reason why a substantial impairment test should be invoked for rejection of
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The ABA Task Force is not equally enamored with this pro-
posal. Its members believe that the opportunity for the buyer to
reject for any defect and the requirement for a precise cure by
the seller will increase the likelihood that the deal between the
parties will break down.9" They have expressed concern over
the impact on the purported common practice of making up
deficiencies in quantity or quality in subsequent installments
and of permitting money allowances for deficiencies in an in-
stallment.9
The concerns of the Task Force are overstated. To the extent
that the business practices that it identifies are actually ob-
served, trade usage and course of dealing will permit their con-
tinuation. Even in the absence of these practices, the seller in an
installment contract has a more generous right to cure the defi-
ciencies than is available to the seller in a contract calling for a
single delivery." Applying the perfect tender rule to rejection
for a single installment cannot really" 'snowball' partial breach-
es into total breaches,"93 because a total breach is governed un-
der the substantial impairment standard of section 2-
612(3)-nonconformity or default with respect to one or more
installments must substantially impair the value of the whole
contract. The current application of section 2-612(2) to a single
installment does not preclude a breach by a seller who tenders
goods that substantially conform. Breach results from any non-
conforming tender. The issue is solely the degree of impairment
required for an aggrieved buyer to be able to reject a noncon-
forming tendered installment.
IV. REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
A. Subjective Standard of Substantial Impairment
The drafters of the U.C.C. adopted the substantial impairment
standard for revocation of acceptance. They did so on the belief
a single installment, although there is a stronger justification for a broader power
by the seller to cure in an installment contract." Id. at 177-78.
90. Task Force, supra note 11, at 1179.
91. Id.
92. See infra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
93. Task Force, supra note 11, at 1179.
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that a buyer should have to meet a higher standard in order to
throw nonconforming goods back onto the seller once the buyer
has accepted their tender. Several reasons have been offered to
support this proposition.
In the first place, the longer the buyer has the goods, the
higher the probability that the alleged defect was caused by
him or aggravated by his failure properly to maintain the
goods. Secondly, the longer the buyer holds the goods (if he
uses them), the greater the benefit he will have derived from
them. All of these factors support a rule which makes it more
difficult for the buyer who has once accepted to cast the
goods and attendant loss from depreciation and market fac-
tors back on the seller.'
These arguments justify deviating from the perfect tender rule
once a buyer accepts goods and subsequently seeks to revoke
that acceptance."
The substantial impairment standard for revocation of accep-
tance is based on the buyer's particular circumstances. In rele-
vant part, section 2-608(1) provides that the buyer may revoke
acceptance of goods "whose non-conformity substantially impairs
[their] value to him."9 The subjectiveness of the standard is
accurately identified in the comments:
[T]he .test is not what the seller had reason to know at the
time of contracting; the question is whether the non-conformi-
ty is such as will in fact cause a substantial impairment of
value to the buyer though the seller had no advance knowl-
edge as to the buyer's particular circumstances. 7
The adoption of this subjective standard has been criticized by
a number of commentators. Its adoption is nevertheless con-
94. WHrE & SUMMRS, supra note 9, at 368-69.
95. Compare Aubrey's R.V. Ctr., Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 731 P.2d 1124 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that although the hardware and some programs performed
properly, the computer system as an integrated whole did not, and thus sub-
stantially impaired its value to the buyer) with Iten Leasing Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,
684 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that the failure of components of a computer-
ized accounting system did not substantially impair the value of the system because
the system met the buyer's needs by being operated without the components).
96. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1990).
97. Id. § 2-608 cmt. 2.
98. One writer contends that
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sistent with the drafters' intent to facilitate aggrieved buyers in
determining the appropriate response to nonconforming tenders
by sellers. The buyer assumes the higher burden of substantial
impairment in justifying a revocation of acceptance, but must do
so only in the context of the buyer's own circumstances.' The
situation in which goods substantially conform on an objective
basis, but are substantially defective to the particular buyer,
would surely be unusual.0 0 The aggrieved buyer's response,
however, can be limited to the buyer's own case, making the
buyer's decision on how to proceed easier. As a general matter,
buyers can rely more confidently upon their own circumstances
when determining whether to revoke the acceptance. In addi-
tion, they can focus the attention of the court and the jury in the
event of litigation on how the breach impacted on their own
specific needs.
The Study Group appropriately has recommended that the
subjective element be included in the other sections of Article 2
in which the substantial impairment standard is contained. The
provision on anticipatory repudiation already includes the sub-
jective element.'' The recommendation thus is to retain the
the Official Comment should be ignored [and the buyer allowed to re-
voke] only if the non-conformity is one that would substantially impair
the value of the goods to the ordinary purchaser, unless seller has reason
to know of buyer's high standards or special needs, in which case the
impairment of the buyer's own particular situation will be the relevant
inquiry.
Whaley, supra note 32, at 76; see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 371
("Why a buyer should be permitted to measure the seller's tender by such subjective
standards is not clear. Judicial attitudes here are by no means uniform, and we
think the courts which give a more objective content to the words 'to him' have the
better of it.") (footnote omitted); Priest, supra note 20, at 979 (suggesting that some
courts "are likely to ignore the Comment and interpret the phrase 'to him' as impli-
cating all of the buyer's loss from the non-conformity except that part which is pure-
ly subjective and unforeseeable").
99. See Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 370 A.2d 270 (N.H. 1977)
(holding that the determination is not made based on the buyer's belief as to the
reduced value of the goods, but rather on an objective determination of the value of
the goods to the buyer); Aubrey's R.V. Ctr., 731 P.2d at 1128 (holding that substan-
tial impairment "is determined objectively with reference to the buyer's particular
circumstances, rather than to his or her unarticulated subjective desires").
100. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 371.
101. U.C.C. § 2-610 (1990) ("the loss of which will substantially impair the value of
the contract to the other").
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subjective element where it is already included 2 and to add it
to the provision on cancellation of an installment contract.'
The subjective aspect of the substantial impairment standard
does not apply to the determination of a breach, but rather it
applies to examining the impact of a breach on the buyer. The
seller's breach is determined by the nonconformity of tendered
goods. 1° The warranty provisions of Article 2 apply to that de-
termination,... not any special needs of the buyer. If the
seller's tender conforms to the contract specifications, the seller
has performed properly and the buyer has neither the right to
reject the goods nor the right to revoke the acceptance.
B. Standards for Revocation
The increased difficulty for a buyer to revoke an acceptance,
compared to rejecting tendered goods, is furthered through addi-
tional requirements that a buyer must meet even though the
accepted goods substantially impair the value of the goods to the
buyer. If the buyer accepted the goods while aware of the non-
conformity, revocation is possible only if the buyer accepted on
the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be
cured, and it is not seasonably cured."6 A buyer who accepts
nonconforming goods while apprised of their defective nature
102. PRELIMiNARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 174 (Rec. A2.6(7)(B)) (anticipatory repu-
diation); id at 170 (revocation of acceptance).
103. See id. at 179 (Rec. A2.6(8)(B)). See generally U.C.C. § 2-612(3) (1990) (con-
taining the objective test). For a discussion of this section of Article 2, see supra
notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
104. The preamble provision of § 2-608(1) provides that "[t]he buyer may revoke his
acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its
value to him." U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
The second inquiry is whether the nonconformity in fact substantially
impairs the value of the goods to the buyer, having in mind his particu-
lar needs. This is an objective question in the sense that it calls for
evidence of something more than plaintiffs assertion that the nonconfor-
mity impaired the value to him; it requires evidence from which it can
be inferred that plaintiffs needs were not met because of that nonconfor-
mity.
Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 545 P.2d 1382, 1384-85 (Or. 1976) (emphasis added).
105. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1990) (express warranties); id. § 2-314 (implied warranty
of merchantability); id. § 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
106. Id. § 2-608(1)(a).
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simply has no grounds to throw the goods subsequently back
onto seller in the absence of any reasonable basis to assume that
the seller had assumed a commitment to correct the deficiency.
In the absence of awareness of the nonconformity, the buyer
can revoke only if acceptance was induced by difficulty of discov-
ery of the defect or by the seller's assurances. °7 This standard
is tied to the incentive for vigilance that Article 2 places on
buyers. An acceptance of tendered goods cannot occur until a
buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods.0 8
The right to inspect is waived by delay, however. This waiver
creates an incentive for buyers to exercise the right to discover
defects in tendered goods as promptly as possible. Any right to
reject based on discoverable defects that is lost because of in-
spection delay cannot subsequently be reinstated in the form of
revocation of acceptance." 9 The buyer is not prevented from
revoking with respect to defects too difficult to discover through
a reasonable pre-acceptance inspection. Another special situation
involves assurances by a seller concerning the conformity of the
goods. Such assurances can lessen a buyer's vigilance in in-
specting the goods and discovering a defect."0 When the buyer
is reasonably induced to lessen inspection vigilance and accept,
the alternative standard for revocation of an acceptance made
without discovery of the nonconformity is satisfied.
The Study Group has recommended that these limitations on
the right to revoke an acceptance be retained in their current
form."' The recommendation is appropriate because the incen-
tive to prompt buyer vigilance is founded on sound commercial
107. Id. § 2-608(1)(b).
108. Id. § 2-606(1)(a)-(b).
109. See In re Barney Schogel, Inc., 12 B.R. 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding
that a buyer who did not discover a defect in specially manufactured windows until
after installation because of a failure to inspect them upon delivery was precluded
from revoking acceptance); Hummel v. Skyline Dodge, Inc., 589 P.2d 73 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding that there is no revocation for defects unknown at the time of
acceptance that could have been discovered through a reasonable inspection).
110. "Assurances" by the seller under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) can rest
as well in the circumstances or in the contract as in explicit language
used at the time of delivery. The reason for recognizing such assurances
is that they induce the buyer to delay discovery.
U.C.C. §2-608 cmt. 3 (1990).
111. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 170 (Rec. A2.6(6)(A)).
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policy that could be circumvented in the absence of these restric-
tions.
C. Effect of Wrongful Revocation
Section 2-608 does not stipulate the consequences of a wrong-
ful revocation. It specifies the standards that control a buyer's
right to revoke and it states the procedures that the buyer must
employ in order to invoke the right, but it does not clarify the
legal effect of a buyer invoking a revocation in the absence of an
underlying right. The Study Group recommends that a wrongful
revocation be considered ineffective."2
This recommendation suggests an additional difference be-
tween rejection and revocation under Article 2. The power to
reject, even in the absence of the substantive right, has been
recognized by commentators as consistent with the drafters'
intent."' Even in the absence of any right to reject, a buyer
effectively can do so by notifying the seller within a reasonable
time after delivery or tender of goods."' Of course, such action
by the buyer constitutes a breach"' and subjects the buyer to
damages for the breach."6 The effectiveness of the rejection,
however, prevents acceptance," 7 and thus the buyer cannot be
held liable for the purchase price of the goods."' The rationale
for allowing wrongful but nevertheless effective rejections is eco-
nomic efficiency. The seller is generally in a better position than
112. See id.
113. See 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COloniN REPORT: STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
CoMIMERCIAL CODE 520 (reprint ed. 1980) (1955) (stating that the "buyer may have
the power to make an 'effective' rejection even though his action is in breach of
contract and subjects buyer to liability for damages") (written by Professor Honnold);
WHITE & SUMIMERS, supra note 9, at 295; Peters, supra note 9, at 241.
114. U.C.C. § 2-602(1) (1990).
115. The obligation of the buyer is "to accept and pay in accordance with the con-
tract." Id. § 2-301.
116. Id. § 2-703 ("[wlhere the buyer wrongfully rejects").
117. Id. § 2-606(1)(b) ("Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer . . . (b) fails to
make an effective rejection . . . .") (emphasis added).
118. Id. § 2-607(1) (providing that acceptance makes the buyer liable to pay for the
goods at the contract rate); id. § 2-709(1)(a) (allowing for a cause of action for the
price of goods accepted).
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the buyer to dispose of the rejected goods and minimize damag-
es.1
9
The same rationale has some merit in the context of wrongful
revocations, but it is outweighed by other considerations that
justify treating revocations differently than rejections. In general
terms, the goods are more likely to have deteriorated or depreci-
ated in a revocation context than in rejection cases.'20 The
seller's superior ability to dispose of the goods may be decreased
when the nature or quality of the goods change.' The justifi-
cations for making revocation of acceptance less readily avail-
able than rejection to an aggrieved buyer also support the refus-
al to recognize the effectiveness of a wrongful revocation:
to leave the burden on the buyer with respect to goods which
might have depreciated, which he might have used to his
benefit, and which he might actually have misused or other-
wise damaged, is consistent with the policy of 2-709 and with
the idea that the buyer should normally have to pay the price
of accepted goods."r
The disparate treatment of wrongful rejections and revocations
stems from the essential recognition that buyers who reject and
buyers who revoke are not similarly-situated parties.
Although the substantive recommendation of the Study Group
in this respect is desirable, the proposed method of implementa-
119. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 291-92, 295.
120. The converse is certainly possible in individual cases. For example, the right
for an opportunity to inspect might extend the reasonable time to reject several
weeks in the case of a complex item, whereas a buyer might accept goods on the
date of delivery on the reasonable assumption of cure and then promptly revoke
acceptance when the seller renounces any intent to cure. Article 2, however, com-
ports with the following admonition: "a general sales law must avoid trying to cover
all situations and provoking litigation by fine distinctions." Ernst Rabel, The Sales
Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 439 (1950).
121. The most obvious case in which a seller would not have an advantage in
disposing of the goods would apply in situations in which a substantial change has
occurred in the condition of the goods. Even if a right to revoke were available, a
revocation is not effective under Article 2 unless it occurs "before any substantial
change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects." U.C.C. §
2-608(2) (1990); see Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that revocation was not available after drapery fabric had been cut into
shades).
122. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 297.
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tion leaves much to be desired. The Study Group recommends
that "[t]he comments should clarify that unless otherwise
agreed, a wrongful rejection [sic] is still an acceptance and that
the buyer's duties and the seller's remedies are controlled by
[sections] 2-607 and 2-703."' Professors White and Summers
have done an excellent job of pinpointing various Code sections
that contribute to the ambiguity concerning the consequence of a
wrongful revocation of acceptance. 1" In addition to using the
comments to draw the distinction in effectiveness of wrongful
rejections and revocations, the drafters of the revision should
carefully implement any changes in the text of these sections
necessary to implement their intentions.
D. Use of Goods After Revocation
A buyer who successfully revokes an acceptance may jeopar-
dize the effectiveness of the revocation by continuing to use the
goods. The same problem exists for a buyer who continues using
the goods following an effective rejection. The courts have been
inconsistent in dealing with the continued use issue.'25 One
line of cases has evolved that preserves the effectiveness of a
rejection or revocation so long as subsequent use of the goods is
"reasonable" and the seller is compensated for the value of the
continued use."6 This approach recognizes the difficulties asso-
ciated with a buyer whose financing is committed to the deliv-
123. PRELIM NARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 170 (Rec. A2.6(6)(A)). The reference to
rejection in this recommendation was clearly a slip of the pen. The recommendation
appears under the discussion of § 2-608 on revocation and the textual discussion
preceding the recommendation refers to revocation.
124. WHTE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 294 n.3, 296-97; see U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b)
(1990) (referencing "effective" rejection); id. § 2-608(2) (referencing "effective" revoca-
tion); id. § 2-703 (index of seller's remedies making parallel reference to wrongful
rejection or revocation); see also id. § 2-709(3) (implying circumstances under which
a buyer who wrongfully rejects or revokes nevertheless will not be liable for the pur-
chase price).
125. See generally R.J. Robertson, Jr., Rights and Obligations of Buyers with Re-
spect to Goods in Their Possession After Rightful Rejection or Justifiable Revocation
of Acceptance, 60 IND. L.J. 663 (1985).
126. On awarding of compensation for post-revocation use, see Erling v. Homera,
Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980); see also infra notes 147-55 and accompanying
text.
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ered product" 7 or who cannot promptly cover in the market-
place.11
8
The opposing line of cases reflects pre-Code law by providing
that any substantial use of goods following their rejection or
revocation of acceptance is wrongful against the seller and pre-
cludes the buyer from effectively claiming the rejection or revo-
cation."9 It is bolstered by the provision of section 2-606(1)(c)
that an acceptance results when the buyer "does any act incon-
sistent with the seller's ownership."'
In discussing the revocation of acceptance section of Article 2,
the Study Group includes a recommendation that the comments
"should elaborate when use of the goods should bar revocation
under § 2-608(2)." '' The Study Group also recognizes the rele-
vance of section 2-606 to this issue,'32 indicating that an appro-
priate answer, in circumstances such as a delay by the seller in
trying to cure or a delay by the buyer in covering, is that "the
buyer should be able to make use of the goods for a reasonable
time upon the payment of reasonable compensation." 133 The
Study Group does not make any recommendation to change
section 2-606, but does recognize the need for greater clarity. It
127. E.g., McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 449 N.E.2d 1289 (Ohio
1983) (buyer's financial position was limited); Mobile Homes Sales Management, Inc.
v. Brown, 562 P.2d 1378 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (most of the buyers' savings were tied
up in the mobile home purchase).
128. E.g., Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (one year required to obtain another X-ray scanner); Minsel v. El
Rancho Mobile Home Ctr., Inc., 188 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (buyers contin-
ued to occupy mobile home for six weeks following revocation because of their inabil-
ity to find alternative housing).
129. E.g., Waltz v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 307 A.2d 815 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973);
Bassman v. Manhattan Dodge Sales, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 128 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1968); George v. Fannin, 588 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); F.W. Lang Co.
v. Fleet, 165 A.2d 258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960).
130. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c) (1990). Conceptual difficulties then follow the determina-
tion of the acceptance. Acceptance precludes rejection of the goods accepted. Id. § 2-
607(2). Following a revocation, the acceptance (or reacceptance in this context) inevi-
tably is made with knowledge of the nonconformity, and does not allow a subsequent
revocation because the acceptance would not have been made on the reasonable
assumption that the nonconformity. would be seasonably cured. Id.
131. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 170 (Rec. A2.6(6)(A)).
132. The Study Group also recognizes the relevance of § 2-602(2)(a) to this ques-
tion. Id. at 163-65. For discussion of this provision, see infra note 137.
133. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 166.
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states as its objective that "limited use should be distinguished
from other acts inconsistent with the seller's ownership,"3 4
and poses the critical question of whether "ordinary use of the
goods [can] be distinguished from an 'act inconsistent with the
seller's ownership.' "''
The repetition of this terminology in section 2-606 predictably
will make the Study Group's laudatory objective more difficult to
attain by perpetuating the Code language that a current con-
trary line of cases has relied upon for support. Giving this lati-
tude through use of the same language in a revision of Article 2
will not promote uniformity of judicial interpretation, notwith-
standing some contrary admonitions in the comments, and will
increase the difficulty of interpretation even for those courts
that are inclined to further the stated objectives of the Study
Group. Continued use of goods following notification of rejection
or revocation is literally contrary to the ownership rights of the
seller, 3 6 and the terminology is simply too weighted to facili-
tate the more balanced perspective that the Study Group is
encouraging the drafters of the revision to seek.'
Helpful insights can be gathered from the experience of the
promulgation of Article 2A, 38 although not from the stated
reasons for the different approach adopted in Article 2A. The
drafters of Article 2A followed many provisions of Article 2,
using the latter as a statutory analogue for their drafting ef-
forts.1' Despite this general approach, they did not incorporate
the section 2-606(1)(c) provision. The comments to Article 2A
state that the provision was omitted "as irrelevant given the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 166 n.9. The ABA Task Force does not make any commentary concern-
ing the revision of § 2-606 or § 2-608.
136. This perspective contributed to pre-Code cases that held that any use of goods
precluded rescission as inconsistent with the revesting of title in the seller. See, e.g.,
Comer v. Franklin, 53 So. 797, 799 (Ala. 1910).
137. Section 2-602(2)(a) adds to the difficulties by providing that "after rejection
any exercise of ownership by the buyer with respect to any commercial unit is
wrongful as against the seller." U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a) (1990).
138. U.C.C. art. 2A (1990) (Leases).
139. Id. § 2A-101 cmt. (Statutory Analogue; Relationship of Article 2A to Other
Articles).
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lessee's possession and use of the leased goods."'40 This reason-
ing is certainly dubious in the context of the present discussion.
Although a lease gives a lessee possession and use of the leased
goods for the duration of the lease term, rejection or revocation
by the lessee ends these interests of the lessee and the residuary
interest of the lessor predominates,' just as rejection or re-
vocation by a buyer ends the buyer's interest in the goods pur-
chased.'
Even though Article 2A omitted any provision comparable to
section 2-606(1)(c), it made an additional change that can be
used to address some of the same issues posed by that subsec-
tion of Article 2. One of the alternative methods of an accep-
tance under Article 2 is for the buyer, following a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the goods, to signify to the seller "that the
goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite
of their non-conformity."" In addition to the lessee signifying
this intent to the lessor, Article 2A provides for an acceptance
when the lessee "acts with respect to the goods in a manner that
signifies" comparable intent.' This wording is certainly suffi-
cient to deal with cases in which the lessee claims to have re-
jected or revoked, but acts inconsistently with respect to the
goods.' 4" It is also balanced enough to allow appropriate cases
to be distinguished. For example, a lessee who revokes accep-
tance, but continues to use the goods in order to mitigate dam-
ages or because cover is not immediately available, has not acted
140. Id. § 2A-515 cmt.
141. Following rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance, both buyers
and lessees have security interests in the goods in their possession or control to
cover payments that they are entitled to recover and expenses incurred in discharg-
ing their duties to care for the goods. Id. §§ 2-711(3), 2A-508(5).
142. "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price." Id. § 2-106(1). A "lease," on the other hand, "means a transfer of the right to
possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration, but a sale, in-
cluding a sale on approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security
interest is not a lease." Id. § 2A-103(1)(j).
143. Id. § 2-606(1)(a).
144. Id. § 2A-515(1)(a).
145. See Oda Nursery, Inc. v. Garcia Tree & Lawn, Inc., 708 P.2d 1039 (N.M.
1985) (holding, in a landscaping contract, that a buyer who removed allegedly deteri-
orating plants from their containers and planted them acted inconsistently with the
claim of prior rejection or revocation).
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with respect to the goods in a manner that signifies a willing-
ness to retain them.146
This solution does not eliminate the need to distinguish con-
tinued use of goods that will or will not adversely affect an effec-
tive rejection or revocation, but it does state a standard that is
more appropriately neutral, giving courts needed flexibility to
make case-by-case determinations. The drafters of the revision
should consider following the lead of the Article 2A section.
E. Compensation for Use of Goods
Another desirable change in the revision of section 2-608
would be to state an obligation of a buyer who revokes to com-
pensate the seller for the use of the goods.'47 A buyer who ef-
fectively revokes is relieved of the duty to pay the contract price
for the goods,'48 and can recover payments already made to the
seller, in addition to damages for breach of contract. The
buyer nevertheless may enjoy the use of the goods for periods
extending up to several months. 5 ' This use of the goods can
occur prior to the actual revocation, 5' as well as after notifica-
tion of revocation in appropriate circumstances. 52 To the ex-
tent that use confers a benefit on the buyer, the buyer should be
required to compensate the seller.
Even though the initial version of Article 2 does not include
any reference to a duty to compensate sellers in these cases, an
expanding number of courts have imposed such a duty.5 ' Be-
146. Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1981)
(continued use of tractor to complete farming operation mitigated damages); see also
Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 704 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (buyer's contin-
ued use of automobile did not bar revocation when seller made repeated unsuccessful
attempts to repair defect), rev'd on other grounds, 709 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1986).
147. Other commentators in accord include WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at
366-67; Jerry J. Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and the Consumer Buyer, 75 COM.
L.J. 354, 357 (1970); Sebert, supra note 7, at 415-17.
148. U.C.C. §§ 2-607(1), 2-709(1)(a) (1990).
149. Id. § 2-711(1).
150. Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 530 P.2d 989 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975) (one year of occupancy before revocation and another 17 months of oc-
cupancy subsequent).
151. Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 382 A.2d 954 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
152. Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn.
1981). See supra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Stroh, 530 P.2d 989; Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 668 P.2d 139
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cause the Code does not displace the applicable principles of
common law,'54 these courts appropriately rely on such prin-
ciples, most notably restitution,'55 which means that the com-
pensation should be based on the benefit received by the buyer,
rather than application of the contract terms or calculations
based on cost to the seller.
V. CURE
A. The Reasonable Grounds Requirement
After a buyer has properly rejected a nonconforming tender,
section 2-508(2) gives the seller an opportunity to cure, provided
that the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that its initial
tender would be acceptable. 5 ' The provision thus limits the
availability to the seller of cure rights following a rejection after
the contract time for the seller's performance has passed.' 5
The Study Group concluded that the "reasonable grounds" test
should be administered expansively, but expressed concern
about the imprecision of the test.5 '
A significant degree of confusion surrounds the "reasonable
grounds" test, and commentators, unfortunately, have developed
a wide array of inconsistent approaches to the statutory con-
struction of the test. 9 The overall performance of the courts
(Kan. 1983); North River Homes, Inc. v. Bosarge, 594 So. 2d 1153 (Miss. 1992);
Jorgensen v. Presnall, 545 P.2d 1382 (Or. 1976).
154. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990).
155. Stroh, 530 P.2d at 993-94; Johnson, 668 P.2d at 145; North River Homes, 594
So. 2d at 1162; Jorgensen, 545 P.2d at 1386.
156. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (1990).
157. In contrast, § 2-508(1) provides an unfettered right to cure during any remain-
ing contract time. A subsequent corrective tender that is extended before the con-
tract time for performance has expired still provides a buyer with the bargained-for
consideration. The Study Group has recommended that a right to cure be extended
to cases in which the buyer revokes acceptance while contract time for performance
still remains. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 141 (Rec. A2.5(5)(A)). The more
controversial issue is whether the cure right should be extended any further in cases
following revocation of acceptance. See infra notes 212-37 and accompanying text.
158. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 142 (Rec. A2.5(5)(B)).
159. Several writers have erroneously adopted a "magnitude of the defect" test for
determining the reasonableness of the seller's belief. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND,
SALES & BULK SALES 121 (2d ed. 1958); Michael A. Schmitt & David Frisch, The
Perfect Tender Rule-An "Acceptable" Interpretation, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1375, 1398
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has also been deficient. Many courts have simply ignored the
stated limitation in applying section 2-508(2).16
Professor Sebert recommends deletion of the "reasonable
grounds" test.'61 He would allow sellers an unfettered right to
cure following either rejection or revocation, 1 2 irrespective of
any basis for the seller to have a reason to believe the tender
would be acceptable. He bases his recommendation on the
broader cure rights of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts."es
The concept of cure in the Restatement is grounded in the con-
tract remedy principle of protecting expectations of the parties
while avoiding waste."6
The rationale that supports the codification of the cure con-
cept in Article 2 differs, however, from the policy objectives of
the cure provisions contained in the Restatement. The Code does
not utilize cure consistently as a waste avoidance technique. In
the absence of an express term in the parties' contract or a sub-
sequent agreement by which the buyer consents to allow
(1982); Wallach, supra note 32, at 28; Whaley, supra note 32, at 57-58; Comment,
Sales of Personal Property-Breach of Warranty-Repair as a Means of Cure Under
Secton 2-508 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 53 IOWA L. REV. 780, 783 (1967).
Another approach has been the argument that a seller should be able to cure when-
ever it will not subject the buyer to great "inconvenience, risk or loss." William D.
Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present and Com-
mercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REV. 697, 724 (1962) [hereinafter Hawkland, Curing an
Improper Tender]. Another author would preclude cure to any seller who is unaware
of a nonconformity of tender. ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
SALES 321 (1970). These statutory constructions are explained and criticized in Law-
rence, Cure Under Article 2, supra note 6, at 156-59.
160. A study concluded that more cases have ignored the requirement in applying
the subsection than. have addressed it. Schmitt & Frisch, supra note 159, at 1380.
161. Sebert, supra note 7, at 425-27.
162. For discussion on the proposal to extend cure rights to cases following revoca-
tion of acceptance, see infra notes 212-37 and accompanying text.
163. Except as stated in § 240, it is a condition of each party's remaining
duties to tender performances to be exchanged under an exchange of
promises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party to
tender any such performance due at an earlier time.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979). For an explanation of this pro-
vision, see Lawrence, Cure Under the Restatement (Second), supra note 6, at 720-24.
164. Lawrence, Cure Under the Restatement (Second), supra note 6, at 724-35; see
also Hillman, supra note 32, at 555 (introducing a model designed to protect expec-
tations and avoid waste); Sebert, supra note 7, at 418-19 (identifying U.C.C. deficien-
cies concerning rejection, revocation, and cure).
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cure,'65 the right to cure is not available if the buyer accepts
the defective tender or delivery and seeks money damages. The
right to cure under section 2-508 applies only when the buyer
rejects the tender because of the seller's noncompliance with
contract requirements. Professor Sebert proposes to extend this
right to cure to cases following revocation of acceptance, but
even that proposal is less inclusive than the Restatement ap-
proach.
The limitation of the section 2-508 cure to the rejection of
goods by the buyer principally reflects a concern with the ad-
verse impact of forfeiture. A buyer who accepts nonconforming
goods can recover damages for the nonconformity, but the buyer
must still pay the purchase price of the goods.'66 Therefore, no
forfeiture of the breaching party's contract rights results. Follow-
ing proper rejection of goods, however, the buyer can cancel the
contract, thereby extinguishing the other party's contract rights,
and also can recover damages." 7 Because the seller's perfor-
mance must satisfy the perfect tender rule, cancellation is possi-
ble, in the absence of cure, even in cases of nonmaterial breach.
Professor Farnsworth, the reporter for the Restatement, has
noted, cure "is more important to a seller of goods, which is
subject to the perfect tender rule, than it is to a builder under a
construction contract, which already has the benefit of the doc-
trine of substantial performance."168 The perfect tender rule,
and the corresponding right to cure, are available only in the
context of buyer rejection of goods.
The comments to section 2-508 illustrate that subsection (2)
strikes a critical balance between the competing interests of the
seller and the buyer: the right to cure protects the seller against
"surprise" rejections, 6 ' and the "reasonable grounds" limitation
165. See Lawrence, Beyond Section 2-508, supra note 6, at 340-57 and the cases
cited therein.
166. U.C.C. §§ 2-607(1), 2-709(1)(a) (1990).
167. Id. § 2-711(1).
168. FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 640.
169. U.C.C. § 2-508 cmt. 2 (1990). The Study Group points out that Article 2 does
not include a provision comparable to cure for the buyer, referring to Professor
Peters' argument that § 2-511(2) "provide[s] a 'minor analogue' for the buyer." PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 139, 140 n.13 (citing Peters, supra note 9, at 222
n.73). Section 2-511(2) provides that "[tiender of payment is sufficient when made by
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protects the buyer against improper allegations of surprise.'7 °
Although cure under section 2-508(2) minimizes the likelihood of
forfeiture that accompanies the requirement that the seller com-
ply with the perfect tender rule, the right to cure is available
only when the seller makes a bona fide effort to comply. There is
no protection for a seller without adequate grounds to believe
that the tender is perfect or that commercially legitimate rea-
sons justify the seller's belief that the tender will not cause the
buyer to complain. The rejection that the seller subsequently
faces must be a surprise because the seller's reasonable expecta-
tions were that the buyer would accept the tendered delivery.'1
7
any means or in any manner current in the ordinary course of business unless the
seller demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension of time reasonably
necessary to procure it." U.C.C. § 2-511(2) (1990). This is comparable to a seller's
right to cure under § 2-508(2). In both instances, one party tenders performance that
is not ultimately satisfactory but has reasonable grounds to believe otherwise. This
reasonable belief gives rise to surprise when the tender is rejected by the other
party. An additional similarity between § 2-508(2) and § 2-511(2) is that both provi-
sions provide further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender. Id. §§ 2-
508(2), 2-511(2).
170. "Subsection (2) seeks to avoid injustice to the seller by reason of a surprise
rejection by the buyer. However, the seller is not protected unless he had 'reason-
able grounds to believe' that the tender would be acceptable." Id. § 2-508 cmt. 2.
171. Several commentators have lauded § 2-508(2) as the appropriate provision to
prevent a buyer from rejecting goods with insignificant defects because the market
price for the goods has fallen and the buyer wishes to escape a bad bargain. See
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 385; Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender,
supra note 159, at 727; Hillman, supra note 32, at 588; Peters, supra note 9, at
210; Priest, supra note 20, at 971-72; Sebert, supra note 7, at 389-95. Others, how-
ever, believe that
[tihis approach attacks the dishonest buyer behavior with the wrong Code
provision and misconstrues the objective of that provision in the process.
Using section 2-508(2) to preclude rejection by a buyer for a minor
breach ignores the "reasonable grounds to believe" limitation contained in
the comments of that section in favor of a substantial performance stan-
dard, which does not comply with the intent of the drafters. The com-
ments to section 2-508 state that "[slubsection (2) seeks to avoid injustice
to the seller by reason of a surprise rejection by the buyer," and goes on
to stress that "the seller is not protected unless he had 'reasonable
grounds to believe' that the tender would be acceptable." Surely it should
come as no surprise to sellers that buyers would like to avoid contracts
that become economically unfavorable; and a falling market condition
itself certainly does not give a seller grounds to believe that a noncon-
forming tender would be acceptable. Properly applied, section 2-508(2)
does not authorize a seller to cure simply because the buyer has rejected
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An absolute right to cure following any rejection would re-
move a desirable incentive for the seller to provide quality per-
formance in the first instance. Some commentators have pointed
out that granting an absolute right may result in an increase in
the incidence of sloppy work and may undermine quality stan-
dards. 72 Professor Sebert answers that market forces and the
importance of developing a reputation for quality products are
much greater influences on product quality.171 While the fac-
tors that Professor Sebert identifies are unquestionably influen-
tial, the extent of product deficiencies in the marketplace dem-
onstrates that his exclusive reliance on these factors is not per-
suasive.
Unquestionably, providing a right to cure following any rejec-
tion distorts the perfect tender rule. With automatic extensions
of time to perform available in all cases, buyers regularly would
be deprived of their legitimate expectation of timely perfor-
mance. Even sellers who are fully informed of the need to com-
ply strictly with timely performance would be afforded addition-
al time to perform. Professor Sebert would not be concerned
with distortions to the perfect tender rule because he advocates
abolishing it as well. 74 With the perfect tender rule intact,
however, the Study Group is correct in recognizing the impor-
tance of retaining a test that sellers must meet before claiming
the statutory right to cure.
The Study Group's concern over the imprecision of the "rea-
sonable grounds" test is more troublesome.17' A myriad of cir-
cumstances inevitably will arise. Consequently, the applicable
standard must be flexible so it can develop over time through
based upon relatively minor defects when market prices are falling.
Lawrence, Perfect Tender Rule, supra note 6, at 570-71 (citations omitted).
172. Schmitt & Frisch, supra note 159, at 1378.
173. Sebert, supra note 7, at 426.
174. Id. at 422-25; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
175. Several commentators have also expressed concern. See Peters, supra note 9,
at 210 (referring to § 2-508 as "remarkably obscure") (cited in Hillman, supra note
32, at 588); Wallach, supra note 32, at 25 ("vague"); Whaley, supra note 32, at 56
("deceptively simple language"); Comment, Uniform Commercial Code: Minor Repairs
or Adjustments Must Be Permitted by a Buyer When the Seller Attempts to "Cure" a
Non-Conforming Tender of Merchandise, 52 MINN. L. REV. 937, 938 (1968) ("poorly
drafted"); Note, supra note 32, at 391 ("confusing language").
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the adjudicatory process.'76 It must be a standard that allows
careful scrutiny of the facts of each case.
Attempts to specify more than "reasonable grounds" in the
statutory text will deprive the courts of the flexibility needed to
achieve just results. The Study Group, for example, recommends
that section 2-508(2) apply when the seller is unaware of a non-
conformity in the goods and that the section be revised accord-
ingly.'77 Its approach is too blunt. The question should not be
asked in the abstract, for the answer inevitably must be that it
depends upon the reasons for the seller's lack of awareness.'78
Wilson v. Scampoli'79 a case that has achieved such landmark
notoriety as a well reasoned opinion that its holding unfortu-
nately is treated like a widely accepted rule, is helpful in illus-
trating this point. In Wilson, the court found the seller had "rea-
sonable grounds to believe that merchandise like color television
sets, new and delivered as crated at the factory, would be ac-
ceptable as delivered." 8 ' This holding should not be accepted
as a generalized rule, however, because additional facts that
should preclude the same result can be imagined easily. The
seller's assumption would not be reasonable, for example, if the
seller had received prior recall orders on some of the unsold
merchandise or if the television sets sold previously were
plagued by an inordinately high number of defects.' 8'
176. "We believe that cure is a remedy which should be carefully cultivated and
developed by the courts-" WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 381.
177. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 142-43 (Rec. A2.5(5)(B)).
178. The Study Group cites T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d
932 (N.Y. 1982), with approval for permitting cure under § 2-508(2) even though the
seller was unaware of the nonconformity in its tender. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra
note 8, at 142 n.17. The court in T.W. Oil stressed, however, that the seller was
justified in believing that the initial tender would be acceptable to the buyer because
the oil, en route to the United States at the time of contract formation, had been
certified for a sulfur content of 0.52% by an Italian refinery. In addition, the court
found that while the seller was unaware prior to tender that the oil had a sulphur
content of 0.92%, it still could have believed that the shipment would be acceptable
because it was aware that Consolidated Edison purchased and burned oil with a
sulphur content of up to one percent. Meeting the "reasonable grounds" test was
thus dependent upon more than just the seller's unawareness of the nonconformity
in its tender. T.W. Oil, 44.3 N.E.2d at 938.
179. 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1967).
180. Id. at 849.
181. For example, the seller's expert witness in Wilson testified that removal of a
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Despite the concerns over imprecision, the "reasonable
grounds" test is a workable standard when the proper focus is
applied. When considered in conjunction with the provisions of
the official comments to the Code and the rationale discussed
previously,' a statement by Professors White and Summers
about the test is particularly helpful. They observe:
[A] seller should be found to have had a reasonable belief
that his tender would have been acceptable any time he can
convince the court that (1) he would have had such reason-
able belief had he not been, in good faith, ignorant of the
defect, or (2) he had some reason, such as prior course of
dealing or trade usage, which in fact reasonably led him to
believe that the goods would be acceptable."l '
This statement is consistent with the views expressed previous-
ly."s A seller who should have detected a problem prior to
making tender should not be surprised if the buyer rejects. Like-
wise, a seller who detected a problem but nevertheless proceeded
without any commercial justification for believing that the buyer
would accept also should not be surprised. Sellers in these cir-
cumstances cannot qualify for the right to cure under section 2-
508(2). The "reasonable grounds" test as a precondition to a
statutory right of cure following rejection should be retained.
B. Repair as a Cure
Another issue raised by the Study Group is whether a seller
can effectively cure by repairing the tendered goods rather than
providing a substitute tender of new, conforming goods.'85 The
Study Group states that repair is recognized as cure when the
television chassis was frequently necessary with new sets to determine the cause of
color malfunction and the extent of adjustment or correction needed to achieve full
operational efficiency. Id. at 850. Depending on the degree of frequency involved, the
seller might reasonably be expected to check the color quality prior to delivery.
182. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
183. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 381 (citation omitted). For an extensive
study that concludes that the White and Summers approach is the appropriate in-
terpretation, see Gregory M. Travalio, The UCC's Three "RYs: Rejection, Revocation
and (the Seller's) Right to Cure, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 931 (1984).
184. See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
185. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 141-43 (Rec. A2.5(5)(A) & (B)).
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agreement of the parties includes an authorization to repair."'
In the absence of an agreement, the Study Group believes that
the answer is not clear and recommends that the Article 2
Drafting Committee resolve the question by revising both sub-
sections of section 2-508.187
This question is part of the broader question of determining
the scope of an effective cure. Section 2-508 provides a qualifying
seller with the opportunity to cure by making a tender or deliv-
ery that is "conforming." Performance is "conforming" to a con-
tract under Article 2 when it is "in accordance with the obliga-
tions under the contract."8 ' The seller's cure tender must be a
perfect tender in all aspects of the contract specifications in
order to constitute an adequate cure, except that additional
reasonable time is allowed when cure is pursuant to section 2-
508(2). If the attempted cure does not satisfy this standard, the
buyer may reject the substituted goods or their tender as non-
conforming. Hence, the perfect tender rule serves as the basis
for measuring the adequacy of cure to prevent further buyer
rejection.
The same legal standard of "conforming" tender applies to
determining whether repair of tendered goods constitutes an
adequate cure. Repair should be permitted when the repaired
goods enable the buyer to receive the bargained-for consider-
ation. The quality of the repaired goods should not be lessened,
and the repair should not leave evidence of its existence.'89 As
the court in Wilson v. Scampoli'" indicates, the buyer is not
required "to accept patchwork goods or substantially repaired
articles in lieu of flawless merchandise." 9' In essence, the re-
paired goods must satisfy all the applicable warranties in order
186. Id. at 142-43. The repair or replacement clause is the most common form of
express term creating cure rights. Section 2-719 specifically authorizes these clauses,
but also regulates them in some aspects.
187. Id. at 14143 (Rec. A2.5(5)(A) & (B)).
188. U.C.C. § 2-106(2) (1990).
189. Comment, supra note 159, at 788; see Worldwide RV Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
Brooks, 534 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (permitting rejection when offered cure
to provide a motorhome with dual roof air conditioning would have left a hole in the
roof where the single unit had been installed).
190. 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1967).
191. Id. at 850.
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for the repair to meet the perfect tender rule and to constitute
an adequate cure.'92
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith9 3 is a case frequently cit-
ed on adequacy of repair as a cure under section 2-508. The
Zabriskie decision is overly restrictive, however. The court found
that the replacement of a defective transmission in a new car
was not an adequate cure, noting that cure "does not, in the
court's opinion, contemplate the tender of a new vehicle with a
substituted transmission, not from the factory and of unknown
lineage from another vehicle in plaintiffs possession."" The
facts revealed that the dealer replaced the defective transmis-
sion with one from another vehicle on the dealer's showroom
floor. "'95 Thus the substituted transmission did not appear to
have been used or defective, nor did the value of the vehicle ap-
pear to have been lessened.
The court in Zabriskie also introduced the "shaken-faith"
doctrine, which examines the effect that knowledge of the origi-
nal defect and the repair has on the disappointed buyer. The
court stated:
For a majority of people the purchase of a new car is a major
investment, rationalized by the peace of mind that flows from
its dependability and safety. Once their faith is shaken, the
vehicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes
an instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired and
whose operation is fraught with apprehension."
The shaken-faith doctrine is useful, provided that it is not
applied as a subjective standard.9 ' The right to reject arises
192. Atwood v. Best Buick, Inc., 484 N.E.2d 647 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (holding
that a vehicle that conformed to the contract and all warranties was not noncon-
forming and that the buyer could not reject).
193. 240 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (cited in PRELIMINARY REPORT,
supra note 8, at 141).
194. Zabriskie, 240 A.2d at 205.
195. Id. at 197. This substitution was presumably a faster method of cure than
waiting for another transmission to be shipped from the factory.
196. Id. at 205.
197. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 384-85. But see Sepulveda v. Ameri-
can Motors Sales Corp., 521 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Civ. Ct. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff's
testimony about his apprehensiveness and lost confidence in purchased car created a
jury issue as to the impairment of the value of the car for him).
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only on a nonconforming tender. The objective standard of war-
ranty obligations applies in determining whether the goods con-
form to the contract. Repair as a cure should be determined
from the perspective of a reasonable buyer. When a repair would
leave a reasonable buyer sufficiently apprehensive about the re-
liability or quality of the product, the buyer fails to receive the
bargained for exchange, and the repair is not an adequate
cure.
198
The court in Zabriskie focused on the buyer's subjective com-
plaints, and the reasonableness of the buyer's shaken faith was
assumed, rather than carefully examined. The buyer argued that
he bargained for "a new car with factory new parts, which would
operate perfectly as represented."'99 The repaired car appears
to have provided the buyer with that consideration. The seller
did not install a rebuilt transmission, giving the buyer patch-
work goods, but rather, completely replaced it. The facts do not
demonstrate that the defect was anything more than an isolated
instance, that the replaced transmission would not enable the
vehicle to perform as represented, that any other components
were defective, or that the events that led to the discovery of the
defect in any way changed the performance capabilities of the
car.
Bayne v. Nall Motors, Inc.2"' provides a better approach to
the shaken-faith doctrine. The court in Bayne stressed the "lack
of positive knowledge that there was no other damage done" in
holding that replacement of the car's differential after its parts
welded and locked the drive train was not an adequate cure."0'
The court reasoned:
The fact that the dealer and manufacturer and their employ-
ees strongly believe in the quality of the repaired auto does
not make this vehicle as acceptable as a similar automobile
that has not experienced the same tremendous internal im-
198. Hemmert Agric. Aviation, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp., 663 F. Supp.
1546 (D. Kan. 1987) (purchaser experienced lack of confidence and fear in handling
characteristics of aircraft purchased for crop-dusting).
199. Zabriskie, 240 A.2d at 200.
200. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1137 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1973).
201. Id. at 1140.
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pact and a reasonable buyer could not be expected to be satis-
fied under the facts herein.2°
The Bayne case aptly illustrates the circumstances in which the
shaken-faith doctrine should operate to exclude repairs or the
replacement of component parts as an adequate cure. Some
courts unwittingly have allowed the doctrine to be used improp-
erly by permitting the buyer to extract another form of cure
without examining the objective reasonableness of the buyer's
concern.
20 3
C. Money Allowance as a Cure
Another question that the Study Group raises, and then de-
fers to the Drafting Committee, is whether a cure can include a
money allowance in favor of the buyer in lieu of the tendering of
new, conforming goods. 214 Under section 2-508(2), the seller
may cure when the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that
the initial tender would be acceptable to the buyer "With or
without money allowance."0 5 In cases in which a seller has
reasonable grounds to believe that a money allowance will make
a nonconforming tender acceptable, but the buyer nevertheless
rejects, the seller may have additional reasonable time to correct
the deficiency.
For example, a qualifying seller under a contract calling for a
large volume delivery might make a tender that is a few units
short but the seller may believe reasonably that the buyer would
find a comparable price reduction to be acceptable. By notifying
the buyer of the intent to cure if the buyer nevertheless rejects,
the seller could tender the missing units promptly, and thus
202. Id. at 1141. Two additional well reasoned cases on this point are Champion
Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 433 A.2d 1218 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (holding that
there is a difference between a car with a new factory-built engine and a repaired
car with a shop-rebuilt engine), and Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978) (pickup truck frame was twisted and diamonded, causing unusual
stress and wear to various moving parts of the truck).
203. See, e.g., Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 370 A.2d 270 (N.H. 1977)
(upholding buyer insistence on replacement of automobile, rather than just the trans-
mission).
204. PREIIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 142-43 (Rec. A2.5(5)(B)).
205. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (1990).
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prevent the buyer from cancelling the contract. If the buyer were
willing to accept a price allowance, a modification to the contract
would be struck,"' but the seller could not force the modifi-
cation on the buyer unilaterally.
Joc Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co.2°7 is an exam-
ple of the appropriate application of the price allowance provi-
sion. In this case, the contract contained a provision on price
adjustment negotiations. The buyer rejected the performance
when certification tests showed the sulfur content of oil tendered
by the seller to be excessively high. The parties then met in an
unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a price adjustment pursuant
to the provision in the contract. The seller offered to cure by
substituting a conforming delivery, but the buyer refused the
proposed cure."'8 The proffered cure was within the scope of
section 2-508: the buyer had rejected the goods and the price
adjustment was not required by the contract as the buyer's ex-
clusive remedy for a nonconforming delivery.00 The court prop-
erly found that the seller reasonably believed in the acceptabili-
ty of the tendered delivery, which was buttressed by the contract
term and the buyer's indication of willingness to keep and use
nonconforming oil if an appropriate price adjustment could be
reached. 10
The Drafting Committee should be explicit in not authorizing
a seller to cure through price adjustment. Rather, the prospects
for price adjustment should continue to be merely an element
that might affect the reasonableness of the seller's belief that
the tendered cure would be acceptable to the buyer despite its
206. See Ethan Dairy Prods. v. Austin, 448 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 1989) (buyer chose a
reduction in price as the remedy for a nonconforming product and the seller acced-
ed).
207. 434 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1980), affd, 447 N.Y.S.2d 572 (App. Div. 1981),
affd, 443 N.E.2d 932 (N.Y. 1982).
208. Id.
209. Id. For a similar holding, see McKenzie v. Alla-Ohio Coals, Inc., 29 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 852 (D.D.C. 1979).
210. The Joc Oil and the Alla-Ohio Coals cases demonstrate the difficulty of price
adjustment clauses in cases in which the nonconformity is qualitative rather than
quantitative. When a few units are missing, the price adjustment can be made by
reference to the contract price. When the goods tendered do not comply with the
contract requirements, however, securing an adjustment through subsequent agree-
ment can be more difficult to achieve.
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nonconformity to the contract. Professors White and Summers
will surely disagree with this position. They have argued else-
where that price adjustment should not be so limited. They
believe that "the buyer who complains of some insubstantial
nonconformity which can be recompensed by a reduction in the
price should be made to accept a reduction as cure even if there
is no usage in the trade to accept such reductions.""'
This position on price adjustment does substantial harm to
the underlying policy of statutory cure following rejection. Man-
datory acceptance of price adjustment significantly interferes
with the buyer's right to receive perfect tender through cure by
the seller. It changes the buyer's right to insist on perfect tender
in the form of a substitute conforming delivery. It also dilutes
the requirement that sellers have "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve" that their tender will be acceptable to the buyer in order
to qualify for the statutory cure right. Allowing cure through
price adjustment effectively transforms the perfect tender rule
into the substantial impairment standard by leaving the ag-
grieved buyer with less-than-conforming goods and monetary
compensation for the shortfall. Mandatory price adjustment is
simply inconsistent with the perfect tender rule.
D. Cure After Revocation
The position of the Study Group on whether a seller should
have a right to cure after a proper revocation by the buyer is
uncertain. In its discussion of section 2-508 the Study Group
Report indicates that its members disagreed on this aspect of
cure and that "[r]esolution of this issue is left for the Drafting
Committee." 1 ' Yet in a specific recommendation under section
2-608, the Study Group stated definitively that the seller should
have a right to cure after revocation when the time for perfor-
mance under the contract has not yet expired, but that "[t]he
right to cure, however, shall not be available thereafter.""' Ir-
211. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 384.
212. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 143.
213. Id. at 171 (Rec. A2.6(6)(B)). The A.B.A. Task Force believes that the seller
should have the right to cure after revocation of acceptance by the buyer. Task
Force, supra note 11, at 1141.
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respective of the ultimate position of the Study Group, the issue
of seller cure following revocation has generated significant
controversy.214
A statutory right to cure should not be extended to sellers
following revocation because the perfect tender rule does not
cover the right to revoke. A buyer who otherwise qualifies can
revoke only if a nonconformity in the goods substantially im-
pairs their value to the buyer. Consistent with cure following a
rejection,215 the revocation would be suspended upon notifica-
tion of the seller's intent to cure. Unlike the rejection cases,
however, cure would be sufficient to thwart a revocation if it
eliminated the substantial impact of the impairment, but never-
theless left the buyer with a nonconforming tender.216 The
buyer's expectation in a sales case is to receive goods that con-
form to the contract. Cure following revocation may leave a
buyer with goods that do not conform in some respect, and only
a right to money damages for the deficiency.
The cure approach incorporated in the Restatement has pre-
cisely this latter effect-a cure effort that raises the level of
performance enough to avoid a material breach is sufficient to
preclude the aggrieved party from cancelling the contract.2 7
The different treatment of a construction contract is again justi-
fied, however, by the significant possibility of forfeiture. Even a
214. Several courts have denied the availability of a right to cure following revoca-
tion. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974); Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes
Group, 668 P.2d 65 (Idaho 1983); Gappelberg v. Landrum, 666 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.
1984). Despite the limitation of § 2-508(2) to cases of rejection, a number of courts
have indicated that the cure rights of that section can apply following a buyer's
acceptance of a nonconforming tender. A.F.L. Falck, S.p.A. v. EA. Karay Co., 639 F.
Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144
(Conn. 1976); Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654
(Minn. 1981); North River Homes, Inc. v. Bosarge, 594 So. 2d 1153 (Miss. 1992).
Several commentators have also argued that a seller should have comparable cure
rights following revocation by the buyer. Hillman, supra note 32, at 587; Sebert,
supra note 7, at 426-28; Travalio, supra note 183, at 976-84; Whaley, supra note 32,
at 75-76.
215. See supra note 45 (outlining what happens when seller notifies buyer of intent
to cure).
216. Sebert, supra note 7, at 427.
217. See Lawrence, Cure Under the Restatement (Second), supra note 6, at 744-47
(contending that material breaches are entitled to cure, but partial breaches are
not).
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party who materially breaches can face substantial forfeiture in
a construction contract because the material and labor applied
in performing cannot be returned upon cancellation of the con-
tract.21 The opportunity to cure addresses that risk of forfei-
ture, giving the breaching party a second chance to raise its per-
formance to the nonmaterial breach level required under these
contracts. On the other hand, cure in Article 2 is limited in or-
der to alleviate the impact of the perfect tender rule and allow a
second chance to meet buyer expectations of receiving a conform-
ing tender. Because the goods themselves are returned to the
breaching seller, sellers faced with a rightful revocation of accep-
tance do not face a forfeiture risk comparable to that faced by
construction contractors.
Professor Sebert vigorously objects that denying sellers a right
to cure after revocation runs counter to the fundamental policy
in the Code of making revocation more difficult than rejection
for the buyer.219 The right to revoke is clearly more limited,
and thus more difficult to attain, for reasons that already have
been discussed.22 ° Increased difficulty of revocation is not an
objective in and of itself, however. Just because revocation is
more difficult than rejection in some respects does not mean
that it therefore must be more difficult in all respects. Other fac-
tors must also be taken into consideration. The differing stan-
dards of measurement for rejections and revocations, and the
attendant potential forfeiture, provide a viable policy basis for
providing statutory cure in one context but not in the other.
Extending the cure right in one class of revocation cases clear-
ly would be unjustified. A buyer who accepts goods while aware
of a nonconformity is entitled to revoke only if the buyer accept-
ed the goods "on the reasonable assumption that its non-confor-
mity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured.
22 1
The buyer is allowed to revoke in this situation only after the
cure effort has already failed. Sellers in these cases surely
should not be afforded a second cure opportunity, but that result
218. A problem with the cure standard under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
is that it is available only in cases involving material breach. Id. at 744-45.
219. Sebert, supra note 7, at 392-93.
220. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
221. U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(a) (1990).
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nevertheless follows from the proposals to give sellers a right to
cure after revocation.
In respect to these cases, many courts and commentators have
failed to recognize the implicit right to cure that is included in
sections 2-607 and 2-608.222 A buyer who accepts nonconform-
ing goods under the assumption that the seller will cure them
can revoke due to the defects only if cure does not follow sea-
sonably. Therefore, the' buyer implicitly grants the seller in
these cases an opportunity to cure after acceptance by the buyer
but before revocation.' Where a buyer properly revokes an ac-
ceptance made while aware of nonconformities, the seller al-
ready will have been given an opportunity to cure. An additional
cure right for the seller, who failed to comply initially, is not
warranted.
The unavailability of a statutory right to cure following an
effective revocation in other contexts-specifically, acceptances
made while unaware of the nonconformity-must not be ana-
lyzed in isolation, but rather in the context of additional Code
provisions. Several provisions create desirable incentives for
both parties, thereby balancing the competing interests of buy-
ers and sellers in cases of nonconforming tender. A buyer who is
aware of defects in the goods, but nevertheless accepts them
without any reasonable belief that the seller will cure, is not
allowed later to reverse this position and revoke the knowing
acceptance. Standing alone, a buyer's lack of awareness of a
nonconformity upon acceptance is not enough. The buyer is
afforded a reasonable opportunity to inspect prior to accep-
222. Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65, 69 (Idaho 1983) ("A right
to cure is relevant only when a buyer has rejected the goods prior to a formal ac-
ceptance and the Uniform Commercial Code does not allow a seller the right to cure
defects following a buyer's acceptance of the goods."); Coyle Chevrolet Co. v. Carrier,
397 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) ("right to cure arises only upon the
buyer's rejection"); Linscott v. Smith, 587 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978)
("right to cure . . . arises only upon the buyer's rejection of the goods").
223. Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 433 A.2d 1218, 1222 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1981) (holding that the seller has right to cure when the "buyer accepts nonconform-
ing goods with the expectation that the nonconformity will be remedied"). This im-
plicit statutory right to cure after the goods have been accepted never applies to an
acceptance when the buyer was unaware of the nonconformity at the time of accept-
ing. If the buyer has not yet discovered the nonconformity, the acceptance could not
have been made under a reasonable assumption that it would be cured.
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tance,22 which will be waived if not exercised in a timely man-
ner.2" Vigilance in the inspection is further promoted by deny-
ing revocation whenever a reasonable inspection should have
revealed nonconformities that are later discovered." 6 When
reasonable assurances by the seller lead a buyer to lessen the
vigilance of his or her inspection, the seller's responsibility is
recognized by preserving the right of subsequent revocation.227
The denial of a right to cure following revocation because of a
defect that was too difficult to discover clearly means that the
seller's statutory cure rights are tied to the buyer's early discov-
ery of the defect, which obviously will not occur in many cases of
latent defects.22 Still, the seller is the party responsible for
that defect. Furthermore, an acceptance induced by seller assur-
ances, or by the latency of the defect, also has significant ad-
verse statutory consequences for the buyer. The buyer loses the
right to reject,2 29 bears a higher burden in order to revoke, 20
and is precluded from revoking if the defect takes too long to
manifest itself."8
The section 2-508 cure right and the implicit statutory cure
right following acceptance both reflect a timing factor as well.
Section 2-508(2) postpones the buyer's right to perfect tender
224. U.C.C. §§ 2-513, 2-606(1)(a)-(b) (1990).
225. Id. § 2-606(1)(b) (providing that acceptance results after "the buyer has had a
reasonable opportunity to inspect" the goods if the buyer does not make an effective
rejection).
226. Id. § 2-608(2). These incentives are desirable, since an early detection of a
deficiency generally will be advantageous. The nature and extent of the problem can
be investigated sooner, responsibility for the deficiency can be discerned more readi-
ly, and the consequences of a breach can be minimized more easily. Vigilance in dis-
covering defects and prompt action to cure together provide the buyer with a con-
forming cure tender relatively close to the time for performance under the contract.
227. Id. § 2-608(1)(b).
228. Vigilance in inspection will not aid discovery when the defect is latent or
otherwise difficult to detect.
229. U.C.C. § 2-607(2) (1990) (providing that the right to reject, which would have
been available if the defect had been discovered, is lost upon acceptance).
230. Id. § 2-608(1) (providing that the defect must substantially impair the value of
the goods to the buyer to allow for revocation).
231. Id. § 2-608(2) ("Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own de-
fects.").
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when the time for the seller's performance has expired, but even
then it affects only the time of ultimate seller performance. By
allowing the seller only a "further reasonable time" during
which to cure, 2 the section serves to minimize interference
with the buyer's right to receive perfect tender. Similarly, the
implicit cure right is invoked only when the buyer is aware of
the nonconformity in the goods but nevertheless acquiesces in a
cure effort by the seller. The timing of the discovery of the defect
is the same. The difference is in the response by the buyer: re-
jection, followed by the seller invoking the statutory right to
cure; or acceptance, based on an assumption of cure, invoking
the implicit right to cure. In either instance, the buyer is enti-
tled, within a further reasonable time for the seller to respond,
to an effective cure from the seller."3 The primary objective of
curing the offending nonconformity close to the time specified in
the contract for the seller's performance is just as possible under
the implicit cure approach as it is under section 2-508. That
time period could be extended considerably, however, if cure was
allowed following revocation.
Professor Sebert argues that this analysis concerning the
timeliness of cure is not persuasive." He dismisses the rele-
vancy of the proximity of cure to the contract date for tender,
and instead compares the speed of the seller's cure following
revocation with the time involved for the aggrieved buyer to ob-
tain adequate coverY5 He argues that even if the cure occurs
months after the seller's initial tender, it should not be deemed
232. Id. § 2-508(2).
233. If the seller's cure does not provide goods whose quality is perfect tender, the
buyer who rejected can then reject the cure tender. Similarly, an aggrieved buyer
who accepted can revoke following an inadequate cure effort. The correlation between
these two courses is not exact, however. Having accepted the goods, the buyer who
affords a seller the implicit right to cure cannot effectively refuse a cure tender that
corrects the substantial impairment but still does not provide perfect tender. Pratt v.
Winnebago Indus., 463 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that the buyers of
motor home who allowed the seller to repair faulty transmission could not revoke
based on additional nonconformities that did not substantially impair the value of
the goods); see also Dehahn v. Innes, 356 A.2d 711 (Me. 1976) (denying revocation
by the buyer who accepted goods under the expectations that the seller would cure,
upon failure of the seller to cure because the defects were "de minimis").
234. Sebert, supra note 7, at 393 & n.106.
235. Id.
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untimely if it occurs before the buyer would be able to cover
elsewhere."
This argument raises three specific concerns. First, the pro-
posals to permit cure following revocation are not based on al-
lowing the right only when the seller can cure faster than the
buyer can cover. The right to cure has never been based on such
an event or assumption, and the adoption of such a standard
would promote undesirable consequences."
Second, the comparison of time to cure and time to cover over-
looks an essential difference between those two options. A buyer
who revokes because of substantial impairment can regain the
right to perfect tender by turning to the market to cover. That
same buyer, if required to yield to a cure effort, will sometimes
have to be satisfied with a cure that provides less than what the
contract requires.
Third, the determination of the time needed to cure, and even
whether the cure effort will be successful, can be determined in
the final analysis only by allowing a seller to proceed. If the cure
effort fails, the buyer can revoke and cover, but only following
the delay involved with ineffective cure.
The rights of a seller to cure after rejection, and after accep-
tance but before revocation, are both provided to alleviate some
of the potential impact of the perfect tender rule. By requiring
full compliance with the contract terms, this rule obviously sets
a high standard for sellers. These statutory cure rights allow a
second opportunity to perform for sellers who qualify, while
interfering only minimally with the buyer's rights to perfect
tender.
236. Id.
237. Basing the right to cure on a priority system of actions taken by the parties
following nonconforming tender by the seller would induce hasty cure and cover
efforts. Furthermore, it would produce duplicative efforts of the parties. If both ef-
forts were nearly complete before one of them was realized, the effort and expense
of the other party could be rendered meaningless.
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E. Cure Beyond Section 2-508
1. Additional Sources of the Right to Cure
Although the cure concept is a desirable innovation of contract
law, it has not fared particularly well in Article 2. Both courts
and commentators frequently have erred in applying the cure
concept. One of the biggest problems has been the failure to give
adequate recognition to four additional sources of the right to
cure within the scope of Article 2. These additional sources are
the implicit right to cure following acceptance under section 2-
607, express terms in the contract, consensual cure in the ab-
sence of express terms, and the unique aspects of cure in install-
ment cases. The section 2-607 implicit cure right has already
been discussed. 8 Courts have generally recognized express
terms which allow a seller to repair or replace defective
goods, 9 although these cases have not generally been per-
ceived as involving cure."4 The discussion here will focus on
the remaining two sources of the cure right.
Even if neither the Code nor the parties' contract terms pro-
vide a defaulting seller with a right to cure a nonconforming
tender, the cure opportunity might be attained by consent. The
seller might offer to correct the deficiency and receive an affir-
mative response from the buyer, or the buyer might request, or
even demand, a cure. Neither contracting party can force the
other side to acquiesce, but when attained, consent creates cure
rights in addition to the ones provided in the Code and the origi-
nal contract terms. Mutual consent of the contracting parties is
necessary because this additional cure right is created as a mod-
ification of the initial contract. Although the terms of the modifi-
cation agreement must then control the extent.and timeliness of
238. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973) (hold-
ing valid a limitation of remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts which
was expressly stated in the contract for sale of a tractor).
240. For a case that should have been governed by the valid "repair or re-
placement" provision in the contract, but in which the court became improperly in-
volved with issues of § 2-508 cure and revocation, see Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales,
Inc., 184 S.E.2d 722 (W. Va. 1971).
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cure rights, several courts have erroneously forced such cases
into an analysis under section 2-508."4
The right to cure a nonconforming tender under an install-
ment contract pursuant to section 2-612(2) differs in several
respects from the right to cure under section 2-508.2 Unlike
the general section on cure, the installment section does not
distinguish cases based on whether the contract time for perfor-
mance has or has not expired. The cure section applies only on a
buyer's rejection, 3 but the installment section prevents the
buyer from rejecting the nonconforming performance if cure is
possible.' Under the general section, sellers must seasonably
notify buyers of the intent to cure, 5 whereas installment con-
tract sellers must give adequate assurance of the cure of noncon-
forming installments.24 In installment contracts the buyer
must accept the tendered installment based on the assurance of
cure,"7 whereas under section 2-508, the buyer has already re-
jected the nonconforming tender and can await the cure effort of
the seller before responding further."5 Section 2-612(2) does
not refer to the section 2-508(2) condition that the seller have
"reasonable grounds to believe", that the nonconforming tender
would be acceptable to the buyer. 9 Finally, under section 2-
241. See Great Am. Music Mach., Inc. v. Mid-South Record Pressing Co., 393 F.
Supp. 877 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (applying § 2-508 to case involving post-rejection con-
sensual cure); Ramirez v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345 (N.J. 1982) (buyers did not even
reject until after consensual cure efforts failed).
242. Section 2-612(2) provides that when a nonconforming installment does not sub-
stantially impair the value of the whole contract, the buyer must accept the install-
ment if the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure. U.C.C. § 2-612(2) (1990).
243. Id. § 2-508.
244. Id. § 2-612(2).
245. Id. § 2-508.
246. Id. § 2-612(2).
247. Id.
248. Id. § 2-508. The Drafting Committee should change this part of § 2-612(2).
The requirement to accept means that if the seller's attempted cure is not adequate,
the aggrieved buyer must be able to revoke the acceptance of the installment rather
than being able to reject the uncured tender. The difference becomes significant in
light of the Study Group recommendation to change § 2-612(2) to apply the perfect
tender rule as the standard governing buyer rejection of a nonconforming install-
ment. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 178 (Rec. A2.6(8)(A)); see also supra
note 88.
249. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (1990).
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508(2), a price allowance is generally not a sufficient cure,' °
but under section 2-612(2) "[c]ure of non-conformity of an in-
stallment in the first instance can usually be afforded by an
allowance against the price.""' These differences demonstrate
that the two sections establishing the seller's right to cure do
not interact. Only section 2-612(2) applies to cases of noncon-
forming tenders of installments. Many courts and commentators
who have addressed the statutory right to cure a nonconforming
installment have failed to recognize these distinctions. 2
The absolute right to cure given to sellers under section 2-
612(2) is sensible. The installment contract creates a continuing
relationship between the buyer and seller that extends beyond
the single nonconforming delivery, and the buyer is not entitled
to cancel that contractual relationship unless the value of the
entire contract has been substantially impaired.2 3 The parties
must continue to deal with each other in the future, making
preconditions for allowing the seller an opportunity to correct a
curable tender less desirable.
2. Restructuring Recommendation
Many of the difficulties with applying the cure concept proba-
bly can be traced to the codification of section 2-508 as a free-
standing provision entitled "Cure by Seller of Improper Tender
or Delivery." It has led courts and commentators to focus on
section 2-508 whenever the cure issue is raised, rather than
giving adequate recognition to the additional sources of the right
250. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
251. U.C.C. § 2-612 cmt. 5 (1990).
252. See, e.g., Bodine Sewer, Inc. v. Eastern Ill. Precast, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 705, 713
(Ill. Ct. App. 1986); Bevel-Fold, Inc. v. Bose Corp., 402 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1980); Graulich Caterer, Inc. v. Hans Holterbosch, Inc., 243 A.2d 253, 261
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968); Continental Forest Prods., Inc. v. White Lumber
Sales, Inc., 474 P.2d 1, 4 (Or. 1970). The recommendation of the Study Group that
in an installment contract "the seller should have power to 'cure' the nonconformity
which is as broad as that granted in § 2-508(1), even though the time for perfor-
mance of that installment has passed," PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 178
(Rec. A2.6(8)(A)), seems to suggest that members of the Study Group were unaware
of the extent of cure rights provided under § 2-612(2).
253. U.C.C. § 2-612(3) (1990). See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing cancellation of installment contracts).
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to cure in Article 2 cases. By tending to pigeonhole most cure
cases into section 2-508, courts and commentators have distorted
the role intended for cure in sales transactions and thus gener-
ated significant error and confusion.
Given these unfortunate tendencies, the Drafting Committee
should eliminate section 2-508 as a free-standing provision. The
section applies only in cases in which a buyer has properly re-
jected; thus it would be preferable to incorporate the provision
into section 2-601, which deals with the buyer's right to reject.
The cure right of section 2-508 has the effect of suspending the
effectiveness of the buyer's rejection, so it logically should be-
come part of the rejection provision. The Study Group's sensible
recommendation to extend a comparable section 2-508(1) right to
cure following revocations in which the time for performance has
not yet expired254 could then be added to the revocation provi-
sion of section 2-608. These organizational changes should facili-
tate an appreciation of the contexts in which the current section
2-508 cure right properly applies. In addition to these changes in
the text, the Drafting Committee should use the comments to
draw attention to the additional sources of cure rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the substantial controversy that has surrounded many
of the issues concerning a buyer's refusal to keep goods tendered
by a seller, the Study Group wisely has not recommended major
departures from the current Article 2 approach. Sound policy
reasons support most of the doctrinal approaches of the original
drafting, although some changes are needed as well. Rather
than deficiencies in the underlying doctrines, the extent of the
controversies suggest the need to improve the form in which the
provisions are drafted. One of the most significant means to
advance understanding in this area is to articulate the relevant
policies that form the basis for the drafting choices.
254. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 171 (Rec. A2.6(6)(B)). See supra note
213 and accompanying text.
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